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Abstract: The methodological individualism and subjectivism of the Austrian tradition in 
economics is often associated with a methodological dualism, i.e. the claim that the nature of 
its subject matter, namely purposeful and intentional human action, requires economics to 
adopt a methodology that is fundamentally different from the causal explanatory approach of 
the natural sciences. This paper critically examines this claim and advocates an alternative, 
explicitly naturalistic and empiricist outlook at human action, exemplified, in particular, by 
the research program of evolutionary psychology. It is argued that, within the Austrian 








JEL-classification: A 12, B 41 
 
 
                                                            
* An anonymous referee’s helpful comments are gratefully acknowledged.   2 
 
“In short, I shall contend that the empirical 
element in economic theory – the only part which 
is concerned not merely with implications but 
with causes and effects ... – consists of 
propositions about the acquisition of knowledge.”  




1.  Introduction 
 
The combination of methodological individualism and subjectivism is commonly regarded as 
constitutive of the research tradition that was originated by Carl Menger (Kirzner 1992a: 73; 
Vanberg 1998)
1 and for which the name “Austrian economics” has become the modern label 
(Vaughn 1994: 3f.; Kirzner 1992b: 122).  
Methodological individualism entails the commitment to explain aggregate or collective 
social phenomena in terms of behavioral choices made by individuals, their interaction-effects 
and unintended consequences.
2 This commitment, in turn, implies that an individualist 
approach must include as its theoretical core – or its principal explanatory conjectures – 
general assumptions about human behavior. The Austrian research tradition is subjectivist in 
its insistence on the fact that subjective preferences and beliefs are essential determinants of 
human action, and that an adequate theoretical account of human behavior must pay proper 
attention to these determinants.  
It is ultimately its thoroughgoing subjectivism that marks the critical difference between 
the Austrian tradition and mainstream, neoclassical economics (Streissler 1972: 427f.). The 
latter may also be said to adhere, in essence, to methodological individualism and to account 
for the subjectivity of human valuations in its concept of utility (Lachmann 1977: 156). With 
its fiction of perfect information, however, neoclassical orthodoxy entirely assumed away the 
very complexities that arise from the subjectivity of perceptions, knowledge and expectations 
(Witt 1992: 216;  2003: 25).
3 Notwithstanding its various refinements, the orthodox approach 
in essence proceeds as if all economic agents would “see” the world as it truly is (and as the 
economic theorist supposedly sees it) and were able to reliably foresee the consequences of 
their actions. Such perspective rules out the possibility that inter-personal differences and 
inter-temporal changes in behavior may be due to differences and changes in subjective 
beliefs about the world, and it affords the economic theorist the luxury of not having to deal 
with what, in this regard, goes on in people’s minds. 
There has been general agreement within the Austrian tradition that an economics that has 
anything of relevance to say about real world economies cannot afford the luxury of 
disregarding the subjectivity, and therefore variability, of human knowledge and beliefs.
4 Yet, 
                                                            
1 With reference to Carl Menger F.A. Hayek speaks of “that methodological individualism which is closely 
connected with the subjectivism of the social sciences” (Hayek 1979: 64). 
2 The principle of methodological individualism has been the subject of extensive debate in the social sciences. 
For a detailed examination of that debate see Vanberg 1975. 
3 U. Witt (1989: 410): “There (in neoclassical economics, V.V.) the subjective imponderabilities ... are simply 
assumed away: Perfect information or, more recently, rational expectation models hypothesize a one-to-one 
relationship between ‘objective’ conditions and the individual agent’s perception of these.” – L. Lachmann 
(1977: 158): “From our point of view, the crucial significance of the emergence of expectations as a problem 
rests in the fact that ... they have thus far proved refractory of all attempts to incorporate them into the formal 
apparatus of the late classical economics of our time.” 
4 This is, of course, also the central message of H.A. Simon’s critique of the neoclassical concept of rationality. 
As Simon (1997: 25f.) puts it: “Neoclassical theory, put in the simplest terms, proceeds as though the facts of the   3 
Austrian economists have been in much less agreement on what such subjectivism implies for 
the manner in which economics can be - or should be - carried out as a scientific enterprise. In 
fact, among advocates of different strands of Austrian economics there has been considerable 
disagreement on the methodological implications that a commitment to subjectivism entails 
(Caldwell 1991: 488; Lavoie 1991: 471, 1994b: 55; Shand 1981: 13).  
The purpose of the present paper is to take a closer look at some of the principal 
arguments that have been advanced by Austrians economists on the methodological 
implications of subjectivism. More specifically, I shall take issue with claims, raised by a 
number of authors within the Austrian tradition, that recognizing the subjectivist determinants 
of human action requires economics (as well as the other social sciences) to adopt a 
methodology that is fundamentally different from the causal explanatory approach of the 
natural sciences. After summarizing these claims (in section 2), I shall critically examine 
(section 3) and contrast them with an alternative, explicitly naturalistic and empiricist outlook 
at human action, exemplified by the research program of evolutionary psychology (section 4) 
and by the theoretical perspectives of biologist E. Mayr and philosopher K.R. Popper (section 
5). I shall further argue that such an alternative, empiricist research program has actually been 
advanced from within the Austrian tradition itself, namely in F.A. Hayek’s work (sections 6 
and 7).
5 My conclusion will be that there are ample reasons for advocates of the Austrian 
research program to revise some of their traditional views on subjectivism, and to part with 
methodological claims that tend to foreclose prematurely promising research. 
 
 
2. Subjectivism and Methodological Dualism in Austrian Economics 
 
In their efforts to specify what they consider to be the most consistent version of 
“subjectivism” Austrian economists have distinguished between a “subjectivism of 
preferences” and a “subjectivism of expectations” (Lachmann 1977: 28) or between “static” 
and “dynamic” subjectivism (O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985: 22; Kirzner 1992b: 122).
6 Such 
distinctions are meant to emphasize that a consistent subjectivism must go beyond 
recognizing the subjectivity of human valuations and take serious the fact that human 
purposeful action is always based on subjective expectations and interpretations, i.e. on 
mental activities such as “ordering and formulating ends, allocating means to them, making 
and revising plans, determining when action has been successful” (Lachmann 1982: 37).  
There is no need in the present context to comment on the controversy over whether or 
not Carl Menger (Chamilall and Krecke 2002) and second or third-generation Austrians, such 
as Ludwig von Mises, can justly be said to have already paid sufficient attention to the 
“subjectivism of expectations” (Lachmann 1982: 36) or adopted a “fully subjectivist treatment 
of choice” (Kirzner 1992b: 126).
7 Nor is there a need to address the issue of whether it was 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
real world are known. ... Now, if you think people can deal with the world as it really is, so that you do not have 
to worry about their subjective view of it, then in order to predict their behavior you simply calculate what would 
maximize utility in that real world. ... If you believe, however, that our minds are very limited, that we can only 
form a very approximate picture of the world, then ... you need a theory of how we make our decisions: you need 
a theory of procedural rationality.”  
5 U. Witt (1989: 417; 1992: 221) has argued in a similar direction, pointing out that Hayek’s “different attitude 
towards the subjectivism problem” is much closer to Carl Menger’s original, “psychologically inspired, 
empirically oriented” approach than to Misesian tradition in Austrian economics. 
6 On the two forms of subjectivism G.P. O’Driscoll and M.J. Rizzo (1985: 22) note: “The first form is most 
closely related to the traditional subjective theory of value and we shall call it ‘static subjectivism.’ In this case, 
the mind is viewed as a passive filter ... . The second form, on the other hand, views the mind as an active, 
creative entity ... . This form of subjectivism we shall call ‘dynamic subjectivism.’” 
7 About L. Robbins’ (1935) influential attempt to infuse Austrian subjectivism into mainstream economics I. 
Kirzner (1992b: 126) notes: The “subjectivism which Robbins brought to synthesis from Vienna was severely 
limited to the ‘static’ aspects of subjectivism.” – On this issue see also J. Wiseman 1985.   4 
not until the “Austrian revival of the 1970s” and its “radical subjectivism”(Lachmann ibid.) 
that the Austrian tradition arrived at a consistent “subjectivism of active minds” (ibid.: 37), or 
whether, as others suspect, the recent “radically subjectivist” movement marks, instead, a 
departure from the paradigmatic core of the Austrian research program (Kirzner 1995: 13). 
My exclusive concern here will be with the above noted claim that the subjectivist dimensions 
of their subject matter require economists to adopt a methodological approach that is 
fundamentally different from the causal explanatory methodology commonly practiced in the 
natural sciences. This claim continues to play a prominent role within the Austrian tradition 
ever since it was first and most forcefully pronounced by Ludwig von Mises and, whether 
directly or indirectly, Mises’ arguments on this issue have clearly been most influential in 
shaping the general paradigmatic outlook of modern Austrian economics (Witt 1989: 411).  
According to Mises, what separates the methodology of economics, and the sciences 
of human action more generally,
8 from that of the natural sciences is the fact that they deal 
with “conscious behavior or purposive activity” (Mises 1990: 19), i.e. with “behavior open to 
the regulation and direction by volition and mind” (ibid.), by contrast to mere reactive 
responses to stimuli “which cannot be controlled by volition” (ibid.: 23).
9 Explicitly rejecting 
K.R. Popper’s falsifiability criterion as the relevant test for empirically contentful scientific 
theories Mises (1978: 69) declares: “It is obvious that all this cannot refer in any way to the 
problems of the sciences of human action.” And by contrast to Popper’s view that the same 
general methodological principles apply to all empirical sciences, including the behavioral 
and social sciences, he insists on a “methodological dualism” that “splits the realm of 
knowledge into two separate fields, the realm of external events, commonly called nature, and 
the realm of human thought and action” (Mises 1957: 1). 
Mises’ arguments in support of his dualism claim are somewhat different for the two 
branches of the sciences of human action he distinguishes between, namely praxeology or the 
praxeological disciplines on the one side and history or the historical disciplines on the other 
(Mises 1978: 41). Economics as a praxeological discipline, so Mises argues, is concerned 
with “the a priory category of action” (ibid.), not with the particular circumstances 
surrounding observable actions. It deals “with the categorical essence of choice and action as 
such, with the pure elements of setting aims and applying means” (1990b: 21), not with “the 
concrete content of the ends men are aiming at” (Mises 1978: 73) or with “the quality of the ... 
means applied” (Mises 1990: 9).
10 It is based on “aprioristic reasoning” (ibid.:29) about 
“choosing as such,” not on psychological arguments on “internal processes determining the 
various choices in their concreteness.”
11 
  The study of the particularities of concrete acts is, in Mises’ scheme, the task of the 
second branch of the sciences of human action, of history. History “comprehends the totality 
of what is experienced about human action” (Mises 1990: 43), its scope is “to investigate 
                                                            
8 As he notes, Mises adopts “the rather heavy term ‘sciences of human action’” (1978: 9) only reluctantly for 
want of a better term: “The German language has developed a term that would have been expedient to denote the 
totality of the sciences dealing with human action as distinguished from the natural sciences, viz., the term 
Geisteswissenschaften.” 
9 As Mises emphasizes, to say that human action is purposive is to say that it is goal-directed, “aiming at a 
definite end and guided by ideas concerning the suitability or unsuitability of definite means” (Mises 1978: 34), 
it is not to say that it is “objectively rational” as judged by an observing third party. Rejecting common 
interpretations of the rationality postulate in economics he notes that “economics does not deal with an 
imaginary homo oeconomicus ... but with homo agens as he really is, often weak, stupid, inconsiderate, and 
badly instructed” (1990: 24). - I have discussed Mises’ views on human action and rationality in more detail in 
Vanberg 2004. 
10 Mises (1990: 21): “Not what a man chooses, but that he chooses counts for praxeology” (ibid.: 21). - What 
praxeology asserts about “action as such” is, as Mises (1978: 44) argues, meant to be “strictly valid without any 
exception for every action.” 
11 Mises (1990: 21): “Praxeology is not based on psychology and is not a part of psychology. ... Psychology 
deals with the internal processes determining the various choices in their concreteness.”   5 
what ends people aim at and what means they apply for the realization of their plans” (ibid.: 
24). And such investigation is, so Mises argues, an exercise in psychological reasoning.
12 It is 
about “understanding the meaning of action” (ibid.: 12) in the sense of inferring the intentions 
and expectations that motivate actual human choices. By contrast to the praxeological 
approach of economics, Mises regards the method of understanding (Verstehen) as “the 
specific method of historical research” (ibid.),
13 as the method that not only historians but “all 
other people always apply in commenting upon social events in the past and in forecasting 
future events” (ibid.: 26). 
  As noted, the reasons why Mises finds it necessary to insist on the methodological 
autonomy of the sciences of human action and their categorical separation from the 
methodological standards that apply to the natural sciences, differ somewhat for the two 
branches, praxeology and history. As far as Mises’ claim is concerned that the praxeological 
branch of the sciences of human action provides a priori knowledge about “the realm of 
human thought and action,” it is obviously incompatible with a methodology à la Popper, 
according to which only empirically refutable theories qualify as ‘scientific.’ Acceptance of 
such a methodological view would, so Mises argues, require one to “deny the cognitive value 
of a priori knowledge” (1978: 5) and it would disqualify all a priori theories, such as 
praxeology, as ‘unscientific,’
14 an implication that, in his eyes, is in apparent conflict with the 
fact that “nothing is more certain for the human mind than what the category of human action 
brings into relief” (1978: 71). 
Mises’ apriorism
15 has been the subject of extensive debate and criticism, and there is 
no need to repeat in detail here the arguments that speak against Mises’ claims.
16 It may 
suffice here to note that the relevant issue is not, as Mises’ phrasing of the matter tends to 
suggest, whether a priori theories can have “cognitive value” (the cognitive value of 
mathematics is surely undisputed). The issue rather is whether theories can be a priori certain 
and non-refutable and, at the same time, have any empirical content, inform us about the 
world of our experience. Popper’s falsifiability criterion is not meant to disqualify non-
refutable theories as “meaningless,” it is meant to separate empirically contentful theories 
from theories that, even though they may provide meaningful insights into matters of logic, do 
not inform us about matters of fact, including facts of human thought and action.
17  
What deserves more attention in the context of this paper are Mises’ substantive 
arguments for why the sciences of human action, the historical disciplines no less than their 
praxeological counterparts, cannot be measured against the same methodological criteria that 
                                                            
12 Mises prefers, indeed, to use the terms “thymology” and “thymological” instead of “psychology” and 
“psychological” in order to separate the kind of psychology that he favored - namely a psychology that is 
concerned with “the mental activities of men that determine their actions” (Mises 1978: 47f.) - from what he 
considered a too narrowly positivist “experimental psychology” (ibid.: 47).  
13 Mises (1978: 50): “Understanding ... refers not to the field of praxeology and economics, but to the field of 
history. It is a thymological category.” 
14 Mises (1978: 70): “If one accepts the terminology of logical positivism and especially also that of Popper, a 
theory or hypothesis is ‘unscientific’ if in principle it cannot be refuted by experience. Consequently, all a priori 
theories, including mathematics and praxeology, are ‘unscientific.’ This is merely verbal quibble.” 
15 M. Rothbard (1990: 317) has summarized Mises’ apriorism as follows: “He assumes nothing about the 
wisdom of man’s ends or about the correctness of his means. He ‘assumes’ only that men act, i.e. that they have 
some ends, and use some means to try to attain them. This is Mises’ Fundamental Axiom, and it is this axiom 
that gives the whole praxeological structure of economic theory built upon it its absolute and apodictic certainty. 
... For this Axiom is true for all human beings, and everywhere, at any time, and could not even conceivably be 
violated.”  
16 I have critically examined Mises’ arguments in some detail in Vanberg 1975: 85ff. – See also Vanberg 2004: 
21. 
17 A theory or conjecture that – as Rothbard (1990: 317) puts it – “could not even conceivably be violated” 
cannot tell us anything about the world of our experience because it allows for all conceivable states of the 
world. It does not tell us what is factually impossible but only what is logically impossible and, therefore, 
inconceivable.   6 
apply to the natural sciences. This is, in the first instance, the argument that mental 
phenomena represent a realm that is categorically separated from the realm of “external” 
(physical and physiological) phenomena, and that they escape, therefore, the methods of the 
natural sciences that are appropriate only for the latter realm. The fact that action is 
determined by ideas, that it “is the mind’s response ... to the conditions in which nature and 
other people’s actions place a man” (Mises 1990: 20), puts it, as Mises asserts, outside the 
explanatory scope of the natural sciences.
18 – It is noteworthy, and I shall return to this issue 
later, that the way Mises puts this argument leaves some room for interpretation. While most 
of  his comments on this matter appear to imply that the divide between the two realms can, 
for principal reasons, never be overcome, in other comments he explicitly limits his claim to 
“the present state of our knowledge” (ibid.: 25),
19 allowing for the possibility that the issue 
may have to be reconsidered in light of the knowledge available at future points in time. 
Mises’ argument that “the methods applied in dealing with natural events” (1978: 47) 
are not applicable to the study of mental phenomena is specifically directed at positivistic and 
behaviorist approaches. Their principal shortcoming is in his view that, by reducing the study 
of human action to stimulus-response schemes (ibid.: 40, 121), they ignore the anticipatory 
capacity of the human mind upon which intentional and purposeful conduct is based, in 
particular man’s capacity to anticipate the conduct of his fellow men (ibid.: 47). The method 
that acting man employs in such anticipation is, as Mises argues, the same method that 
constitutes the methodological autonomy of the various historical disciplines, namely the 
“study of meaning” (ibid.: 43) or the method of “understanding (Verstehen)” (ibid.: 48). It is a 
method that allows these disciplines privileged access to “the ultimate principles” governing 
the phenomena they study (Mises 1990: 9), namely knowledge “about the meaning which 
acting men attach to their action” (ibid.: 8). Understanding, or the study of meaning, deals 
with “the reactions of the mind,” i.e. “with something invisible and intangible that cannot be 
perceived by the methods of the natural sciences,” which, so Mises argues, the natural 
sciences must, however, recognize “as real also from their point of view, as it is a link in a 
chain of events” (Mises 1978: 47f.).  
It is not only the method of understanding but also the “the category of finality” (ibid.: 
36) that separates, in Mises’ view, the sciences of human action from the natural sciences.
20 
As he puts it: “The natural sciences are causality research; the sciences of human action are 
teleological” (ibid.: 7).
21 While the former argue in terms of cause and effect, the latter argue 
in terms of “final causes” (ibid.: 37), in terms of “the ends sought by acting men in pursuit of 
their own designs” (ibid.: 7). It is, so Mises notes, the finality or ends-oriented nature of 
purposeful human action that makes it impossible to “apply to the behavior of man the same 
methods the natural sciences apply in dealing with the behavior of mice or of iron” (ibid.: 37).  
As an additional, and separate, argument in support of his autonomy claim Mises 
finally stresses the fact that the sciences of human action deal with phenomena the complexity 
of which precludes the kind of experimental research that he considers constitutive for the 
natural sciences. As he puts it: “The experience to which the natural sciences owe all their 
success is the experience of the experiment. ... The social sciences cannot make use of 
                                                            
18 Mises (1978: 121): “(H)uman reaction is determined by ideas, a phenomenon the description of which is 
beyond the reach of physics, chemistry and physiology. There is no explanation in terms of the natural sciences.”  
19 Mises (1990: 25f.): “But as long as we do not know how external (physical and physiological) facts produce in 
the human ‘soul’ definite thoughts and volitions resulting in concrete acts, we have to face an insurmountable 
dualism. ... Reason and experience show us two separate realms: the external world of physical and 
physiological events and the internal world of thought, feeling, and purposeful behavior. No bridge connects – as 
far as we can see today – these two spheres.”  - See also Mises 1957: 1. 
20 Mises (1978: 121): “(T)he natural sciences have no intellectual tool to deal with ideas and with finality.” 
21 Mises (1978: 43): “The natural sciences do not know anything about final causes. For praxeology finality is 
the fundamental category.”    7 
experiments. The experience with which they have to deal is the experience of complex 
phenomena” (1990: 5).
22 
Mises is generally recognized as the single most influential inspiration for modern 
Austrian economics. Even if not all aspects of his theoretical system -  such as, for instance, 
his apriorism - find general acceptance, it is, in particular, his methodological dualism that 
seems to have become a rarely if ever disputed core tenet of the Austrian paradigm. I. Kirzner 
(1978: vi) certainly expresses a commonly shared view when he approvingly notes: 
“Economics, Mises explained again and again, is a discipline the character of which differs 
drastically from that of the natural sciences.”  
More recently the methodological dualism in the Austrian school has been reinforced 
and given a new direction by the “radical subjectivism” of Ludwig Lachmann. Though 
Lachmann does not agree with Mises’ praxeological apriorism, he too insists that it is the 
intentionality and purposefulness of human action as a “manifestation of the human mind” 
that commands “the methodological independence of the social sciences” (Lachmann 1977: 
61).
23 Taking his lead from Max Weber
24 and the “understanding-approach” (Verstehende 
Soziologie) in early twentieth century German sociology, Lachmann argues that the method 
of Verstehen “which aims at the discovering the meaning of things” (ibid.: 49) is the adequate 
method for Austrian economists for whom “the thought design, the economic calculation or 
economic plan of the individual, always stands in the foreground of theoretical interest” (ibid.: 
47).
25 It is a method, he notes, that is “closed to the natural sciences” (ibid.: 58) and that 
“apparently conflicts with most methods used in and suitable to the natural sciences” (ibid.: 
49).  
While Mises and Lachmann equally emphasize the role of understanding as the 
principal method of the sciences of human action, a method that they see in contrast to 
behavioristic approaches,
26 there is a significant difference in their respective interpretations 
of this method. As has been noted above, to Mises it is an exercise in psychological or – as he 
prefers to call it – “thymological” reasoning, it is an inquiry into the intentions and 
expectations that motivate human choices. By contrast, and in a somewhat ambiguous 
manner, Lachmann insists that as a “principle of explanation” the method of Verstehen “has 
nothing to do with psychology” (Lachmann 1977: 155). As an “analysis of observed 
phenomena in terms of pre-existing plans” (ibid.), he argues, it is concerned “with purposes, 
not with motives, with plans, not with the psychic processes which give rise to them, with acts 
of our conscious minds, not with what lies behind them” (ibid.).
27 
Lachmann’s version of the Verstehen approach has become the inspiration for a rather 
peculiar – and highly controversial (Vaughn 1994: 127ff.) – variety in modern Austrian 
economics, described by its advocates as “interpretative turn” (Lavoie 1994a: 1), a turn that is 
                                                            
22 Mises (1978: 69): “There are in this orbit no such things as experimentally established facts. All experience in 
this field is ... experience of complex phenomena”. 
23 Lachmann (1977: 169): “The concept of ‘Purpose,’ for example, has long been discarded by the older natural 
sciences like physics, and has now even been expunged from biology. Yet, it remains an indispensable tool of 
the social sciences. Where human action is concerned, a purely behavioristic approach can answer none of our 
questions. It certainly cannot explain, i.e. make intelligible, a single human act.” 
24 Lachmann (1977: 95) - Lachmann (ibid.: 35) notes about the relation between Max Weber and Ludwig von 
Mises: “Their personal acquaintance was brief, though, confined to the few summer months Weber spent at the 
University of Vienna in 1918. Both men shared an interest in neo-Kantian philosophy and an aversion to the 
cruder brands of positivism and behaviorism.” –  I have compared Mises’ and Weber’s versions of subjectivism 
in some detail in Vanberg 1975: 85ff.; 101ff.. 
25 Lachmann (1977: 153) defines Verstehen as the “method which explains human action in terms of plans, 
constituted by mental acts and linking an imagined future to an active present.” 
26 Lachmann (1977: 153): “The alternative principle of explanation is, of course, that of ‘response to stimulus.’”  
27 A somewhat different emphasis is implied when Lachmann (1977: 173) notes: “Not the psychological causes 
of human action, but their logical consequences form the subject matter of the analytical social sciences.” – See 
also ibid.: 168.   8 
claimed to be “simply a vindication of the traditional Austrian positions against positivist 
neoclassical philosophical attitudes” (Lavoie 1994b: 54). The “hermeneutical Austrians,” as 
Don Lavoie (ibid.: 55) and other champions of this “turn” call themselves, share the Austrian 
emphasis on subjectivism, “methodological dualism” (Lavoie 1991: 477) and the rejection of 
a “crude behavioristic stimulus-response scheme” (ibid.: 486). And they endorse, in 
particular, Lachmann’s view of economics as “a subject that needs to deploy the methods of 
Verstehen, of the interpretation of meaning, and not think of itself as a natural science trying 
to establish causal laws” (Lavoie 1994a: 9). It is their main tenet, however, that, in order to be 
true to Lachmann’s “vision of what a truly interpretive approach to economics can be like” 
(ibid.: 11), Austrian economists must adopt a different - namely “hermeneutical” -  
methodological foundation for their analytical efforts than what has been practiced in the 
Austrian tradition so far. As Lavoie (1994b: 55) phrases it: “The hermeneutical Austrians 
contend that none of the Austrians’ usual methodological positions, from Aristotelianism to 
Kantianism, to Neo-Kantianism, to Popperianism, adequately captures the virtues of their own 
substantive economics, and that contemporary hermeneutics does.” 
In embracing the “post-modernist philosophical position” (Lavoie 1994a: 5f.) to be 
found in the “philosophical hermeneutics” of such authors as Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur or Richard Rorty (Lavoie 1994b: 54), the “hermeneutical Austrians” 
hope to find the appropriate methodology that, finally, allows the subjectivism of the Austrian 
tradition to be developed to its full potential, namely to the “economics of meaning” (Lavoie 
1994a: 9) that Lachmann envisioned. The essential merit of these “contemporary versions of 
the Verstehen approach”  (Lavoie 1991: 482) is, according to Lavoie, that they imply a 
reinterpretation of what “subjectivism” is about, away from the idea that “meaning is 
‘internal’ to a single mind” (ibid.: 472) towards the notion that meaning “resides ‘within’ the 
inter-subjective.”
28 Though it is by no means easy to decipher what such reorientation of 
subjectivism is exactly meant to be about, it is apparent that Lavoie sees the distinguishing 
characteristic of the hermeneutical approach that he endorses in the fact that it is not about 
“seeing things from the agent’s point of view” (ibid.), but is concerned with a kind of 
“meaning” that is separable from the intentions of the acting person.  
Whether or not such “hermeneutical subjectivism” amounts at all to a research 
program that can be meaningfully classified as “Austrian” need not be of concern in the 
present context.
29 Of principal interest here is the fact that Lavoie and his fellow 
“hermeneutical Austrians” not only subscribe to but even reinforce the methodological 
dualism that Mises had made a trade-mark of the Austrian school, and that to them, as for 
Mises, it is its concern with “the purposes of the individual human beings who make up an 
economy” (Lavoie 1991: 474) that requires economics to adopt a methodology entirely 




                                                            
28 With reference to a Verstehen approach that inquires into the subjective meaning of actions Lavoie (1991: 
482) notes: “I see no reason to interpret subjectivism in this way. ... Meaning can be viewed as something that 
resides ‘within’ the inter-subjective, and this is taking place out in the open all the time and all around us.” 
29 For a critique of this new, hermeneutical branch of the Austrian tradition see H. Albert (1988) who concludes 
that “the anti-naturalistic hermeneutics in the spirit of Heidegger ... leads to a methodological subjectivism which 
has nothing in common at all with the original subjectivism of the Austrian School” (ibid.: 593). – Albert’s main 
objection is that “nothing can be gained ... by wiping out the important difference between the problem of the 
interpretation of words and sentences and the problem of the explanation of human action by using the term 
‘hermeneutical’ in the loose way which we owe to modern hermeneutical philosophy” (ibid.: 595). 
30 Though in this regard, too, Lavoie (1991: 477) argues somewhat ambiguously when he notes: “The point is 
not to abandon the study of causation, but to recognize the fact that many of the relevant causes we are looking 
for in economics are themselves meanings.”   9 
3. Methodological Dualism Critically Examined 
 
So far I have mainly recorded the principal arguments that have been put forward in the 
Austrian tradition in support of the claim that economics, if it is to take proper account of the 
intentionality and purposefulness of human action, must adopt a methodology fundamentally 
different from that of the natural sciences. The purpose of the present section is to critically 
examine these arguments, while the remaining sections of this paper will discuss theoretical 
approaches that, in contrast to the dualism claim, adopt an explicitly naturalistic outlook at 
human action. 
Methodological arguments are meta-theoretical arguments or statemens about 
theories. They come either in the form of normative principles that are supposed to guide 
scientific inquiry into fruitful directions, or in the form of factual judgements about certain 
properties of theories. If they are meant as normative principles, methodological arguments 
can be neither true nor false. They can only turn out to provide more or less fruitful guidance 
to scientific inquiry, and they can prospectively be judged in terms of their likely effects. If 
they are meant as factual claims about theories, they can be true or false. They can be 
critically examined in terms of the viability of their premises and they can be confronted with 
the factual properties of theories. 
In the sense of the noted distinction, methodological dualism can be meant either as a 
normative principle or as a factual claim. If it is meant as a normative principle, as the 
recommendation that the sciences of human action should adopt in their explanatory 
endeavors a methodology categorically different from the causal-explanatory approach of the 
natural sciences, it has to be judged in term of its ‘fruits,’ i.e. the insights it generates, 
compared to the ‘fruits’ of research programs that aim at a naturalistic, causal explanation of 
human action. If it is meant as the factual claim that human action, for principle reasons, 
simply cannot be explained in terms of naturalistic, causal theories, it is either true or false. 
And whether it is one or the other has to be judged in terms of the sustainability of the reasons 
cited in its support and in light of the factual state of our theoretical knowledge. It must be 
regarded as questionable when its premises can be shown to be faulty, and it must be regarded 
as falsified when theories become available that allow for a causal explanation of human 
action. 
The ‘Austrian’ defense of methodological dualism, summarized above, is essentially 
based on the factual claim that a causal explanation of intentional human action is impossible. 
If this claim is meant to say that we have no theories that would provide a satisfactory 
explanation, it must be judged in terms of our current theoretical knowledge and may have to 
be revised as new knowledge becomes available. If it is meant to say that such explanation is 
‘in principle’ impossible, because of the ‘nature’ of human action, it ignores the simple fact 
that we have no other knowledge of the ‘nature’ of things, including the ‘nature’ of human 
action, than what our theories tell us. To make such ‘in principle’ claims means, therefore, 
that one pretends to know more than one possibly can know, namely more than what our 
currently available theories tell us. It follows that the dualism claim deserves serious 
discussion only if it is meant in the first sense, i.e. as a judgement about the state of our 
theoretical knowledge at a given point in time. 
It helps to avoid confusion about the methodological status of the social sciences to 
carefully distinguish at the outset between two issues, namely, on the one hand, the issue of 
whether the subject matter of the social sciences includes ‘subjective’ phenomena, by contrast 
to the ‘objective’ phenomena studied by the natural sciences, and, on the other hand, the issue 
of whether the methods applied in studying these phenomena should be or need to be 
‘subjective,’ by contrast to the ‘objective’ methods of the natural sciences (Boehm 1982: 44). 
Only the second issue is of relevance here. That the social sciences deal with subjective 
phenomena such as people’s purposes, intentions, expectations, beliefs, etc. is not   10 
controversial at all among defenders of the methodological autonomy of the social sciences 
and their opponents. The controversy is about whether their concern with subjective 
phenomena requires the social sciences to adopt a methodology fundamentally different from 
that of the natural sciences.
31 
With regard to the latter issue, a major source of ambiguity in the Austrian rejection of 
a natural sciences approach to social science is the failure to carefully distinguish between the 
rejection of a ‘mechanistic’ approach and the rejection of a causal explanatory approach to 
social phenomena. When Mises (1978: 3) charges that the “study of economics has been again 
and again led astray by the vain idea that economics must proceed according to the pattern of 
other sciences” it makes quite a difference whether this is meant as a critique of attempts to 
model economics “after the scheme of classical mechanics” (ibid.: 39), or whether it is meant 
as a rejection of the notion that the logic of explanation is the same in all empirical sciences, 
in the social sciences no less than in the natural sciences. It is the second and not the first 
issue that is controversial among advocates of methodological dualism and their opponents. 
Both sides can easily agree in their critique of an economics that - like “Walrasian general 
equilibrium analysis” (Lavoie 1994: 10) - transfers the mechanical paradigm of classical 
physics to the study of human action, interpreting the world of social interaction in analogy to 
the world of interacting physical forces (Mirowski 1989). What they disagree about is the 
issue of the methodological autonomy of the social sciences. 
F.A. Hayek has explicitly distinguished between the two issues, and this is the proper 
place to look at his arguments, anticipating the later, more general discussion of his approach 
(section 6). As has often been noted, one can find in Hayek’s writings, especially in The 
Counter-Revolution of Science, remarks on “the contrast between the subjectivist approach of 
the social sciences and the objectivist approach of the natural sciences” (Hayek 1979: 47) that 
seem quite similar to Mises’ or Lachmann’s dualistic outlooks. In particular his critique of the 
methodological attitude that he describes as “scientism or the scientistic prejudice” (1979: 
24)
32 has been cited as evidence of such similarity (Dufourt and Garrouste 1992: 28). Yet, a 
careful reading of Hayek’s arguments clearly shows that the target of his criticism of 
“scientism” is not an empiricist, naturalistic approach to social phenomena but an approach 
that seeks to mold the social sciences along the “physics model”(Hayek 1982: 289) in “slavish 
imitation of the method and language of science” (Hayek 1979: 24), based on a “superficial 
similarity of procedure with that of the physical sciences” (Hayek 1978a: 31). His rejection of 
a ‘scientistic’ approach to the social sciences that mimics the specific paradigm and analytical 
apparatus of physics does not imply, however, that he endorses Mises’ apriorism or 
Lachmann’s anti-naturalistic hermeneutics (Witt 1992: 222). 
In fact, in contrast to Mises’ verdict, quoted above (p. 4), Hayek on a number of 
occasions has explicitly endorsed K.R. Popper’s falsificationist methodology (Hayek 1973: 
29, 146; 1976: 43; 1978a: 31), for instance, when he notes about Popper’s “critical 
rationalism”: “It seems to me the best term for describing the general position which I regard 
as the most reasonable one” (1967d: 94). The fact that in the preface to his “Studies in 
Philosophy, Politics and Economics” (1967: viii) Hayek attributes a “slight change” in the 
tone of his critique of “scientism” to the influence of Karl Popper has often been quoted in 
                                                            
31 It is interesting to note that from C. Menger to L. von Mises the ‘Austrian’ perspective on this issue has 
changed. Menger (1963: 59, fn. 18) argued: “The contrast between the theoretical natural sciences and the 
theoretical social sciences is merely a contrast of the phenomena which they investigate from a theoretical point 
of view. It is by no means a contrast of method.” – Mises (1978: 45) voices the opposite view when he states: 
“What distinguishes the sciences of human action from the natural sciences is not the events investigated, but the 
way they are looked upon.” 
32 See e.g. Hayek (1979: 78): “The attitude which, for want of a better term, we shall call the ‘objectivism’ of the 
scientistic approach to the study of man and society, has found its most characteristic expression in the various 
attempts to dispense with our subjective knowledge of the working of the human mind, attempts which in 
various forms have affected almost all branches of social study.”   11 
support of the conjecture that Hayek’s original views on the methodology of the social 
sciences were much more in agreement with Mises’ methodological dualism. Such 
interpretation is, however, not only difficult to reconcile with Hayek’s early call for an 
empiricist approach to “mental phenomena” (1979: 48) to which I will return below (section 
6). It is also in contrast to Hayek’s own assessment of the matter.
33  
While he shares Popper’s general methodological outlook, Hayek emphasizes, though, 
that the criterion of falsifiability must be interpreted somewhat differently in the social 
sciences than in a science like physics, because of the complexity of the phenomena that they 
study. In this sense he is in perfect agreement with Mises’ argument that the “experience with 
which they (the social sciences, V.V.) have to deal is the experience of complex phenomena” 
(Mises 1990: 5). By contrast to Mises he does not draw the conclusion, however, that this is a 
reason to claim methodological autonomy for the social sciences, nor does he conclude that 
the complexity of the phenomena they study prevents the social sciences from aiming at 
causal explanations. Hayek’s conclusion rather is that, because of the specific problems that 
arise “in connection with those essentially complex phenomena of which social structures are 
so important an instance” (Hayek 1978a: 32), our explanatory ambitions must be more modest 
in the social sciences than in the physical sciences. While the latter can aim at “complete 
explanations” and “specific predictions,” Hayek sees the social sciences generally limited to 
what he calls ”explanations of the principle” and “pattern predictions” (Hayek 1967a: 11; 
1979: 86). Yet, this is, as Hayek points out, a limitation that the social sciences share with the 
natural sciences to the extent that the latter deal with complex phenomena as well.
34 
The methodological distinction that Hayek emphasizes cuts across the traditional 
distinction between the social and the natural sciences. It is a distinction between sciences that 
study “relatively simple phenomena” (Hayek 1967b: 25), or “closed systems” with a 
“sufficiently small” number of connected variables (Hayek 1967a: 3f.), and sciences that 
study “the more complex phenomena of life, of mind, and of society” (Hayek 1967b: 25), 
such as, in particular, evolutionary biology (Hayek 1967a: 11f.).
35 According to Hayek, what 
is true for the theory of evolution by natural selection can be said about theories of complex 
phenomena more generally, namely that they provide “an account of a process the outcome of 
which will depend on a very large number of particular facts, far too numerous for us to know 
in their entirety” (Hayek 1973: 23f.). Even if we understand the general laws that are in 
operation in the respective realm, due to our lack of knowledge of the particular facts that 
determine the course of events, we will not be able to come up with more than an 
“explanation of the principle” and a “prediction merely of the abstract pattern the process will 
follow” (ibid..).  
Such limitation to explanations of the principle and to pattern predictions does not 
mean, so Hayek argues, that we have to abandon a falsificationist methodology. Because, and 
to the extent that, they exclude conceivable courses of events, theories of complex phenomena 
                                                            
33 Recollecting his early reading of Popper’s original German version (published in 1935) of The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery Hayek notes that he had been led, “already, to the understanding of what became Popper’s 
main systematic point: that the test of empirical science was that it could be refuted, and that any system which 
claimed that it was irrefutable was by definition not scientific” (Hayek 1994: 51). And he continues: “I was not a 
trained philosopher; I didn’t elaborate this. It was sufficient for me to have recognized this, but when I found this 
thing explicitly argued and justified in Popper, I just accepted the Popperian philosophy for spelling out what I 
had always felt” (ibid.). 
34 Hayek (1967a: 20): “(A)s the advance of the sciences penetrates further and further into more complex 
phenomena, theories which merely provide explanations of the principle ... may become more the rule than the 
exception. Certain developments of recent years, such as cybernetics, the theory of automata or machines, 
general systems theory, and perhaps also communication theory, seem to belong to this kind.” 
35 Hayek (1967b: 31): “Probably the best illustration of a theory of complex phenomena ... is the Darwinian 
theory of evolution by natural selection.”   12 
are empirically contentful and refutable (Hayek 1967b: 28),
36 even if we need to recognize 
that the “degree of falsifiability necessarily decreases” (Hayek 1973: 29), compared to 
theories of more simple phenomena. This inherent “drawback” of theories of complex 
phenomena
37 is in Hayek’s view neither a reason for the social sciences to claim 
methodological autonomy, nor should it be considered a defect that they need to overcome in 
order to be more ‘scientific’ (Hayek 1967a: 16). Instead, he argues, for sciences of complex 
phenomena such as economics “it may prove necessary deliberately to cultivate the technique 
of explanation of the principle” (ibid.: 21).
38 
The principal lesson from Hayek’s argument on the complexity issue is that we must 
carefully distinguish between two claims, namely, on the one hand, the claim that the 
complexities of human action and of social phenomena put limits on the degree of specificity 
and falsifiability that we may hope to achieve in our explanatory efforts and, on the other 
hand, the claim that these complexities make it necessary for the sciences of human action to 
abandon the standard concept of causal explanation in favor of a different methodology. This 
distinction is of immediate relevance for the principal argument that Austrian advocates of 
methodological dualism rest their case on, namely that the subjectivity of intentional human 
action precludes any causal, ‘mechanistic’ explanation.  
If this argument is meant to say that the complexity of the mental processes from 
which human actions result make it, as a rule, impossible for us to fully explain and to predict 
specific actions, it is perfectly compatible with Hayek’s view on the methodological status of 
theories of complex phenomena. In this interpretation, Austrian subjectivism can well be 
accommodated within the standard notion of causal explanation, more broadly understood to 
include not only ‘deterministic’ explanations but explanations of the principle as well.
39 The 
case for methodological dualism can, therefore, not be based on the complexity argument 
alone, but needs to be supported by additional arguments for why a causal explanation of 
intentional human action should not be possible. The versions of Austrian subjectivism that I 
have summarized above (section 2) appear to rest their case for methodological dualism 
essentially on two arguments. This is, on the one side, the argument that, because human 
action is based on subjective intentions and expectations, understanding these intentions and 
expectations rather than causal analysis is the appropriate method of inquiry. And this is, on 
the other side, the argument that, because human action is purposeful and goal-directed, it 
must be explained in teleological rather than in causal terms. 
In examining the ‘understanding’ issue one should, again, at the outset separate what 
is controversial and what is not controversial among the advocates and the opponents of 
methodological dualism. Our ability to successfully interact with others is, quite obviously, 
based on our capacity to infer their intentions, beliefs and expectations from their observed 
behavior as well as on our capacity to predict their behavior, based on assumptions about their 
motivations. That we can, in this sense, ‘understand’ other persons’ actions, in our daily lives 
as well as in our role as social scientists, is not controversial at all among advocates of 
methodological dualism and their opponents. What the latter oppose is the claim that “this fact 
                                                            
36 About the Darwinian theory Hayek (1967b: 32) notes: “The theory as such, as is true of all theories, describes 
merely a range of possibilities. In doing this it excludes other conceivable courses of events and thus can be 
falsified. Its empirical content consists in what it forbids.” 
37 Hayek (1967a: 16): “It is undoubtedly a drawback to have to work with theories which can be refuted only by 
statements of a high degree of complexity.” - Hayek (1967b: 28): “Such a theory will, of course, in Popper’s 
terms, be one of small empirical content.” 
38 Hayek (1967b: 29): “The advance of science will thus have to proceed in two different directions: while it is 
certainly desirable to make our theories as falsifiable as possible, we must also push forward into fields where, as 
we advance, the degree of falsifiability necessarily decreases. This is the price we have to pay for an advance 
into the field of complex phenomena.” 
39 J. O’Driscoll and M. Rizzo (1985: 22ff.) appear to take this view when, in their discussion of the 
methodological implications of “dynamic subjectivism,” they note that Hayek’s non-deterministic concept of 
pattern explanation is “consistent with dynamic subjectivism” (ibid.: 27).    13 
must lead to specific methodological problems which require a general methodology for the 
social sciences which differs from the methodology of the natural sciences” (Albert 1988: 
575). 
When we seek to ‘understand’ other persons’ behavior, we seek to identify mental 
states, namely intentions, beliefs, expectations, etc., that would make the behavior 
‘meaningful’ or consistent. In doing this, we form conjectures about what kind of intentions, 
beliefs, etc. may have actually motivated the behavior that is to be explained (Koppl 1994: 
72). These conjectures may be true or false, and the crucial issue is how we can decide among 
potential “competing conjectures about subjective meaning” (ibid.: 73). The heuristic strategy 
to imagine ourselves in the position of the person whose behavior we want to explain may be 
a useful tool for generating such conjectures, but it clearly does not qualify as an inter-
subjective test for choosing among competing conjectures. The latter requires us to refer, in 
some manner, to observable indicators for the, themselves unobservable, intentions, beliefs, 
etc. that are imputed to the actor (Witt 2003: 24). Obviously, if one wants to avoid circular 
reasoning, the behavior that is to be explained cannot at the same time serve as the observable 
evidence from which the imputed mental states are inferred (Böhm 1982: 47). One needs to 
refer to inter-subjectively accessible evidence that is, on the one hand, independent of the 
behavior that is to be explained, and that can, on the other hand, be conjectured to indicate the 
actual presence of the mental states that are imputed to the actor. 
As soon as one specifies the method of ‘understanding’ in the above manner, it 
becomes very doubtful whether understanding actions is something entirely different from a 
causal explanation and whether there is, indeed, any reason for drawing a categorical 
methodological line between the understanding-based analysis of social phenomena and the 
nomological, causal analysis of physical phenomena (Albert 1988: 581, 586f.). Both, the 
imputation of mental states as reasons for action as well as the specification of observable 
indicators for mental states imply conjectures about causal relations, namely as conjectures 
about how mental states are causally connected to revealed behavior and how mental states, 
themselves, are connected to, or causally affected by, observable events.
40  
What has been said above about the issue of ‘understanding’ is of direct relevance for 
the second principal argument in defense of methodological dualism, namely the claim that, 
because of its purposiveness and goal-directedness, human action has to be explained in 
teleological rather than in causal terms. Here again, it is useful to separate first the 
controversial from the uncontroversial. What is not controversial at all is the fact that human 
action is goal-directed, based on ‘planning ahead,’ on foresighted anticipation of its 
consequences. In this sense it is, if one wants to use this term, ‘teleological,’ aiming at a 
“telos”.
41 Controversial is only whether this undisputed fact implies that human action 
requires a special, namely a ‘teleological’ type of explanation, an explanation that is about 
‘final causation,’ ‘backward causation’ or ‘causation by consequences,’ by contrast to the 
‘efficient causation’ of the standard causal model.  
Upon closer inspection the claim that human action represents a case of backward 
causation or causation by consequences, as opposed to ordinary causation by antecedent 
causes, turns out to be little more than an instance of careless and misleading use of language. 
Its advocates surely do not want to say that actions are literally caused by the consequences 
that materialize as their effects. What they most probably want to say is that human actions 
are motivated or ‘caused’ by their anticipated and desired consequences. Yet, to argue that an 
                                                            
40 Citing the views of A. Schütz and F. Machlup, R. Koppl (1994: 72) points out that an ‘understanding’ 
approach need not be “anti-theoretical” and need not imply a dualism “according to which quite different 
epistemological principles apply to mental and physical phenomena.”  
41 When L. Robbins (1981: 3.) notes that explanations in economics “must to some extent be teleological” he 
clearly uses the term ‘teleological’ in this sense. He does not want to deny at all that explanations in economics 
are subject to “the usual logical requirements of a science” (ibid.: 9). He only wants to emphasize “that 
explanations of economic relationships must involve considerations of purposes” (ibid.: 3).   14 
action occurs because the actor expects and wishes them to bring about consequences of a 
certain kind is clearly not the same than to argue that actions are caused by the consequences 
that result from them. By contrast to the latter the anticipation of consequences and the desire 
to bring them about antecede the actions that they motivate. To account for their role as 
causes of actions does not require us at all to abandon the standard notion of ‘efficient 
causation.’ 
Opponents of methodological dualism have no reason to deny that such cognitive 
factors as intentions, desires and beliefs play a causal role in human action, and they can 
easily agree with the claim that “the sciences of human action are teleological” (Mises 1978: 
7) if this is only meant to emphasize that explanations of human action must account for the 
role of cognitive factors, by contrast to purely physicalist accounts in the natural sciences. 
They will, however, insist that causation by such cognitive factors is still causation in the 
standard sense, namely causation by antecedent factors, even if cognitive factors are 
admittedly causal factors of a special kind (Meyer 2002: 117; Mackie 1974: 285f., 295f.). 
 
 
4. Evolutionary Psychology: A Naturalistic Approach to Mental Phenomena 
 
As noted above, methodological arguments are statements about theories. Methodological 
dualism is a conjecture about the relation between two bodies of theories, theories about 
mental phenomena on the one side and theories about “external events” on the other. It claims 
that, because of inherent differences between these two realms, theories about “the realm of 
human thought and action” (Mises 1957: 1) are of a categorically different nature than 
theories about external events. Even though this claim is often stated as if it were an 
ontological statement about the “nature” of the respective realms, it can in fact, as I have 
argued above, never be more than a conjecture about the state of our theoretical knowledge. 
After all, we cannot know more about the “nature of things” than what our theories tell us. 
Accordingly, it is ultimately not in terms of methodological arguments per se that the claim of 
methodological dualism must be judged, but in terms of our theoretical knowledge. This fact 
is, even if only in a passing manner, recognized by Mises when he limits his dualism claim to 
“the present state of our knowledge” (Mises 1990: 25), implicitly acknowledging that it may 
have to be revised in light of future theoretical developments.  
The ‘behaviorist’ psychology that Mises accused of neglecting the cognitive 
foundations of human action may have, indeed, been a just target of his fundamental 
objections against empiricist, naturalistic approaches to human action. Yet, psychology has 
not only changed since Mises made his case, it underwent, in particular, what has been called 
the ‘cognitive revolution,’
42 and whether Mises’ verdict is still valid today has to be judged in 
light of contemporary psychological theories, theories that take a significantly different 
outlook at mental phenomena than the “crude behavioristic stimulus-response scheme” 
(Lavoie 1991: 484) that Mises and modern hermeneutical Austrians attack.
43  
                                                            
42 H. Simon (1997: 79): “About thirty years ago there occurred in psychology a ‘cognitive revolution’, which 
resuscitated older methodologies – rejected by Behaviorism – for studying complex human thinking, problem 
solving and decision making; and which introduced powerful new methodologies.” - H. Simon sees in the 
cognitive revolution the prospects for a theory of the mind on which a ‘subjectivist’ economics can be based. As 
he argues: “Unless we have a theory of how the human mind operates, we have few grounds on which to build 
an economic theory that will talk about the kind of uncertain world we live in. ... I believe that we have made 
great progress toward building a theory of human thinking in the last 30 years, and therefore I am optimistic 
about the opportunities to apply it to economics” (ibid.: 26). 
43 Modern cognitive psychology explicitly seeks to account for internal, dispositional variables that intervene 
between “external events” and behavioral responses. They are, therefore, hardly a just target of Mises’ (1978: 
37) comment: “The same external events produce in different men and in the same men at different times 
different reactions. The natural sciences are helpless in face of this ‘irregularity.’”   15 
The purpose of this section is to take a closer look at evolutionary psychology as one 
of the post-cognitive-revolution approaches in modern psychology. To be sure, the tenets of 
evolutionary psychology are by no means undisputed and they are presented here not as 
unquestionable wisdom but as conjectures that are subject to further inquiry and critical 
examination. Yet, evolutionary psychology is of particular interest in the present context 
because it represents, on the one side, a rigorous effort to provide a purely naturalistic, causal 
account of the human mind and of human action, and sees itself, on the other side, as an 
integral part of the cognitive reorientation in psychology, a reorientation that explicitly rejects 
the “anti-mentalism” (Badcock 2000: 111) of behaviorism. According to L. Cosmides and J. 
Tooby (1987: 302), two main initiators of this research program, evolutionary psychology is 
concerned with “the discovery and principled investigation of the human psyche’s innate 
cognitive programs.” “It unites modern evolutionary biology with the cognitive revolution” 
(Cosmides, Tooby, Barkow 1992: 2).
44  
While the principal ambition of evolutionary psychology is to better understand “the 
evolved information-processing mechanisms that comprise the human mind” (Cosmides, 
Tooby, Barkow 1992: 2), its fundamental tenet is that, because humans are the product of the 
evolutionary process, the explanation of their characteristics, including the “architecture of the 
human mind,” must be sought in the evolutionary process (Cosmides and Tooby 1987: 278; 
1994c: 47). Since the human mind is a product of evolution - so evolutionary psychologists 
argue - inquiring into the conditions of man’s evolutionary history should provide clues for 
our understanding of how the mind works. They base their research strategy on the argument 
that, “given the long human generation time, and the fact that agriculture represents less than 
1% of the evolutionary history of the genus Homo” (Cosmides and Tooby 1992: 222), our 
genetic make-up can safely be assumed to be essentially the same as that of our ancestors who 
predated the appearance of agriculture and modern forms of life. Therefore, evolutionary 
psychologists conclude, the most reasonable conjecture is that man’s genetically coded 
psychological mechanisms are adapted to the problem environment that our ancestors were 
exposed to for thousands of generations, living as hunters and gatherers in small bands (ibid.: 
219; Cosmides, Tooby, Barkow 1992: 5). And we should expect to find the kinds of recurrent 
problems that such a hunting and gathering way of life typically posed to be reflected in the 
evolved architecture of the human mind (Cosmides and Tooby 1994b: 86).
45 Inquiring into 
these adaptive problems, this is the fundamental heuristic premise of evolutionary 
psychology, provides “a powerful engine of discovery” (Cosmides and Tooby 1992: 221), “a 
heuristic for generating testable hypotheses about the structure of the cognitive programs that 
solve the adaptive problems in question” (Cosmides and Tooby 1987: 302). 
It is noteworthy that, in his The Ultimate Foundations of Economic Science (1978), 
Ludwig von Mises has pointed in rather similar terms to the evolutionary origins of the human 
mind, without drawing what would seem to be a rather compelling conclusion, namely that, if 
the human mind is a product of the natural forces of evolution, it should be a legitimate 
subject of naturalistic, explanatory inquiry.
46 One might well have expected von Mises to 
proceed to a naturalistic theory of the human mind when he argues: 
                                                            
44 L. Cosmides and J. Tooby (1994c: 42): “Indeed, a theoretical synthesis between the two fields seems 
inevitable, because evolutionary biologists investigate ... the set of adaptive information-processing problems the 
brain evolved to solve, and cognitive scientists investigate the design of the circuits or mechanisms that evolved 
to solve them.” 
45 Tooby and Cosmides (1992: 64): “It is, therefore, meaningful to ask what kind of cognitive design features 
would have constituted good solutions to adaptive problems that persisted over many generations. Evolutionary 
biology and hunter-gatherer studies supply definitions of the recurrent adaptive problems humans faced during 
their evolution, and cognitive psychology describes the information-processing mechanisms that evolved to 
solve them.” 
46 H. Albert (1988: 592) points to the discrepancy between Mises’ evolutionary arguments and his 
methodological dualism when he notes: “Mises himself refers to the fact that the human mind has acquired its   16 
 
The concepts of natural selection make it possible to develop a hypothesis about the 
emergence of the logical structure of the human mind and the a priori. 
  Animals are driven by impulses and instincts. Natural selection eliminated 
those specimens and species which developed instincts that were a liability in the 
struggle for survival. ... We are not prevented from assuming that in the long way that 
led from the nonhuman ancestors of man to the emergence of the species Homo 
sapiens some groups of advanced anthropoids experimented, as it were, with 
categorical concepts different from those of Homo sapiens and tried to use them for 
the guidance of their conduct. ... Only those groups could survive whose members 
acted in conformity with the right categories, i.e., with those that were in conformity 
with reality and therefore – to use the concept of pragmatism – worked (Mises 1978: 
14f.). 
 
Yet, instead of embarking on an inquiry into what an evolutionary account may be able to tell 
us about the structure of the human mind, Mises cuts off such a research avenue by simply 
declaring: “However, reference to this interpretation of the origin of the a priori categories 
does not entitle us to call them a precipitate of experience” (Mises 1978: 15). Instead, he 
insists that the human mind cannot be adequately approached, in a “Darwinian spirit,” as a 
natural phenomenon “without recourse to finality” (ibid.). It is the categorical difference 
between phenomena of the human mind and what goes on in non-human nature that, in his 
view, makes the mind’s evolutionary origins essentially irrelevant for our understanding of its 
functioning (ibid.: 1f., 8).  
  One of the principal conclusions that evolutionary psychologists draw from their 
Darwinian outlook is a critique of rational choice theories (Vromen 2002: 188). A theory that 
interprets the human mind as a general purpose mechanism with universal, content-
independent problem-solving capacity is in their view extremely implausible from an 
evolutionary perspective (Cosmides and Tooby 1992: 164). Recognizing the evolutionary 
origins of the human mind imposes, as they argue (Cosmides and Tooby 1992: 108; 1994b: 
88f.), constraints on what we can assume about its problem-solving capacities, namely 
evolvability constraints and solvability constraints. One must be able to show that the 
faculties that one ascribes to the human mind could, in principle, have evolved under the 
conditions that, as far as we know, characterized the evolutionary history of our species.
47 
And one must, secondly, be able to show how these faculties enable the mind to, in fact, solve 
the problems in question. As Cosmides and Tooby (1992: 110) put it: “To be a viable 
hypothesis about human psychological architecture, the design proposed must be able to meet 
both solvability and evolvability criteria: It must be able to solve the problems that we 
observe modern humans routinely solving and it must solve all the problems that were 
necessary for humans to survive and reproduce in ancestral environments.” 
  It is in terms of the evolvability and solvability constraints that evolutionary 
psychologists find standard rational choice theory to provide an implausible account of human 
capabilities. As far as the solvability constraints are concerned, they argue that “no one has 
yet been able to specify a general learning mechanism or general cognitive  problem solver 
that has the power to solve the complex array of adaptive problems faced by humans, either in 
principle or in practice” (Cosmides and Tooby 1987: 298). With regard to the evolvability 
constraints they point out that evolutionary biology provides a number of reasons why it is 
implausible to assume that “the human mind is an equipotential, general-purpose machine” 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
structure in the course of evolution. ... This implies that there are general laws of its functioning which can in 
principle be discovered.” 
47 Cosmides and Tooby (1994b: 97): “Cognitive programs that systematically violate this constraint cannot be 
selected for ... . Evolvability constraints ... specify the class of mechanisms that can, in principle, evolve.”   17 
(Cosmides and Tooby 1994b: 89), and why it is much more plausible to adopt “the contrary 
view that the mind is richly textured with content-specialized psychological adaptations” 
(Cosmides and Tooby 1992: 165), adaptations that serve to solve long-standing evolutionary 
problems (Cosmides and Tooby 1994a: 329; 1994c: 65). Evolutionary psychologists do not 
deny the presence of domain-general cognitive mechanisms, their argument is that not all 
innate cognitive programs can be of a general-purpose nature but that some of them must be 
domain-specific, “functionally specialized procedures that exploit the recurrent properties of 
the corresponding domain in a way that would have produced an efficacious solution under 
Pleistocene conditions” (Cosmides and Tooby 1992: 221). Such domain-specific cognitive 
mechanisms, Cosmides and Tooby (1994b: 89) argue, “can be expected to systematically 
outperform (and hence preclude or replace) more general mechanisms,” because - by contrast 
to the latter - they exploit the stable structural features of evolutionary recurring situations.
48 
  As a paradigmatic example of such specialized cognitive mechanisms
49 evolutionary 
psychologists point to Noam Chomsky’s (1980) psycholinguistics and its principal conjecture 
that the human capacity of language-learning cannot be explained on the basis of general-
purpose mechanisms alone but requires the presence of a functionally distinct mental organ, a 
“language acquisition device” (Tooby and Cosmides 1992: 95; Badcock 2000: 246).
50 
According to Cosmides and Tooby (1987: 290f.), Chomsky’s contribution marked a turning 
point in modern psychology because it drew attention to the idea that “just as the body has 
many different organs, each of which is specialized for performing a different function ..., the 
mind can be expected to include many different ‘mental organs’.”  
  An area to which evolutionary psychologists have paid special attention in their search 
for domain-specific cognitive mechanisms is cooperation for mutual benefit and, in particular, 
social exchange. As Cosmides and Tooby (1994c: 48) put it:  
 
The adaptive problems that arise when individuals engage in this form of cooperation 
have constituted a long-enduring selection pressure on the hominid line. 
Paleoanthropological evidence indicates that social exchange extends back at least 2 
million years in the human line, and the fact that social exchange exists in some of our 
primate cousins suggests that it may be even more ancient than that. It is exactly the 
kind of problem that selection can build cognitive mechanisms for solving. 
 
In a world in which mutually beneficial cooperation is a more sustainable source of gains than 
unilateral exploitation (Cosmides and Tooby 1992: 207), cognitive programs that better 
enable individuals to successfully engage in mutually beneficial exchange can be expected to 
outperform other mechanisms. And here, as in other areas of human problem-solving, 
evolutionary psychologists conjecture that specialized programs are likely to be better adapted 
to handle recurrent problem-situations than general-purpose algorithms, and that we should, 
accordingly, expect the human mind to contain specialized mechanisms designed for 
reasoning about social exchange (ibid.: 163, 207f.; 1994a: 330; 1994c: 49). Such specialized 
adaptations to social exchange are, as they argue, particularly important where the 
                                                            
48 Cosmides and Tooby (1994a: 329): “Natural selection could equip humans’ cognitive specializations with 
design features and problem-solving strategies that exploited the presence of these problem-specific regularities 
to solve particular classes of problems in efficient ways appropriate only to this class. ... For the problem 
domains they are designed to operate on, specialized problem-solving methods perform in a manner better than 
rational.”  
49 Cosmides and Tooby (1994b: 88): “(H)umans are equipped with a diverse range of adaptations designed to 
perform a wide variety of tasks, from solicitation of assistance from one’s parents, to language acquisition, to 
modeling the spatial distribution of local objects, to coalition formation and cooperation, to the deduction of 
intentions on the basis of facial expression.” – See also Cosmides and Tooby (1992: 166). 
50 It has to be noted that Chomsky’s theory is itself subject to the kind of objections that are raised against 
“modularity theories” in general, including evolutionary psychology. See e.g. Tomasello (1999: 94, 203).   18 
complexities of non-simultaneous trade are concerned (Cosmides and Tooby 1992: 169) and 
where, for instance, the capacity to reliably separate reciprocating cooperators from 
exploitative cheaters is an essential prerequisite for lasting success (ibid.: 181ff.). 
  Another issue that evolutionary psychologists have focused their research interest on, 
and one that is of particular interest in the context of this paper, concerns the human ability to 
“read other people’s minds” and to anticipate their likely behavior. By contrast to 
methodological dualists, like Ludwig Lachmann, who take this human ability, the capacity of 
“Verstehen” or “understanding,” as evidence supporting their anti-naturalistic methodology, 
evolutionary psychologists seek to provide a naturalistic, explanatory account of this very 
capacity as “an evolved attribute of human beings” (Badcock 2000: 114).
51 As Cosmides and 
Tooby (1994b: 101f.) explain: 
 
Another important set of evolutionary long-enduring regularities is the recurrent 
design features of other human minds. Evolved domain-specific cognitive 
specializations are even more necessary in this area, not only because other minds 
constitute the single most important selective force facing any individual human, but 
also because mental states such as beliefs, motives, intentions, and emotions cannot be 
directly observed. To allow a human to represent at least some of the mental states that 
generate other’s behavior, special inferential systems must be available to bridge the 
gap from the observable to the unobservable. For example, if there is a reliable 
correlation over evolutionary time between the movement of human facial muscles 
and emotional state or behavioral intentions, then specialized mechanisms can evolve 
that infer a person’s mental state from the movement of that persons facial muscles. 
 
According to Cosmides and Tooby (ibid.: 102f.), research efforts in the field of cognitive 
development provide substantial support for the hypothesis that our evolved psychological 
architecture includes a specialized “theory of the mind module” that enables us to reliably 
develop models of other human minds. 
  As noted before, a relatively new research program like evolutionary psychology is, of 
course, not undisputed (Badcock 2000: 17ff., 108). What is important in the present context 
is, however, the general research program on which evolutionary psychology is based, not 
specific claims that are made by various researchers associated with this program. Objections 
that may well be raised with regard to such particular claims should not distract from the fact 
that the general paradigmatic outlook of evolutionary psychology is shared by a variety of 
modern approaches in the cognitive sciences, in psychology and in evolutionary biology that 
seek to study the human mind from a naturalistic, explanatory perspective (Tooby and 
Cosmides 1992: 93). This general outlook interprets the human mind as an adaptive, 
information-processing system that translates informational input into behavioral output. It 
seeks to explain the working principles of this information-processing system in light of the 
fact that its structure has been shaped by evolutionary forces. And it assumes that the human 
mind,  like all information-processing systems, can be described in mutually compatible and 
complementary ways, on the one hand, in terms of its physical components – or its 
“hardware” – and, on the other hand, in terms of the programs that govern its operations – its 
“software.” (Cosmides and Tooby 1987: 283f.; 1994c: 44).  
It is in terms of such interpretation of the mind as an information-processing system 
that L. Cosmides, J. Tooby and J.H. Barkow (1992: 8) note in their Introduction to The 
Adapted Mind – Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture: 
 
                                                            
51 It is worth noting that some of F.A. Hayek’s arguments on the issue of  “Verstehen” or  “understanding” are 
very much compatible with the outlook of evolutionary psychology. See Hayek (1967c: 46ff.).   19 
The brain takes sensorily derived information from the environment [including the 
organism’s ‘internal’ environment, V.V.] as input, performs complex transformation 
on that information, and produces either data structures (representations) or behavior 
as output. Consequently, it too, can be described in two mutually compatible and 
complementary ways. A neuroscience description characterizes the ways in which its 
physical components interact; a cognitive, or information-processing, description 
characterizes the ‘programs’ that govern the operation. In cognitive psychology, the 
term mind is used to refer to an information-processing description of the functioning 
of the brain. ... An account of the evolution of the mind is an account of how and why 
the information-processing organization of the nervous system came to have the 
functional properties that it does.
52 
 
According to this outlook at the mind, human problem-solving behavior is guided by 
programs
53 that incorporate “knowledge” of relevant contingencies in man’s problem 
environment and that enable humans to respond more speedily and effectively to typical, 
recurrent problem situations than an exclusively general-purpose device, called “rationality,” 
would allow them to do.  
Even though its focus is on the kind of “knowledge” that is the result of natural 
selection and that is “stored” in genetically encoded programs (Cosmides and Tooby 1987: 
287) evolutionary psychology does not deny the role of general-purpose devices and the 
plasticity of human learning. Evolutionary psychologists insist, however, that such general-
purpose devices and human learning can only work with the aid of domain-specific cognitive 
mechanisms that selectively pre-structure the otherwise unmanageable complexity of the 
world. As Tooby and Cosmides (1992: 105) put it: “A mechanism unaided by domain-
specific rules of relevance, specialized procedures, ‘preferred’ hypotheses, and so on could 
not solve any biological problem of routine complexity in the amount of time the organism 
has to solve it, and usually could not solve it at all.”
54 
  The clue to understanding the impressive problem-solving capacity and cognitive 
power of the human mind, this is the principal tenet of evolutionary psychologists, is to be 
found in the richness of its evolved content-specific mechanisms. They hold “that the human 
capacity for adaptive flexibility and powerful problem-solving is so great precisely because of 
the number and the domain-specificity of the mechanisms we have” (ibid.: 113), and they 
reject accounts that attribute such capacity entirely to domain-general, content-independent 
mechanisms. Not only are such accounts, in their view, highly implausible in light of 
accumulating research-evidence (ibid.: 103). To attribute man’s cognitive abilities to a 
globally defined capacity “rationality” means, they censure, merely to put a label on a 
phenomenon instead of actually examining it (ibid.: 113). As Tooby and Cosmides (1992: 
122) put it, rationality “is not an explanation for anything, but is rather a phenomenon that 
itself requires explanation.” 
 
                                                            
52 Cosmides and Tooby (1987: 282): “Behavior is ... elicited by information, which is gleaned from the 
organism’s external environment, and, proprioceptively, from its internal states. ... The evolutionary function of 
the human brain is to process information in ways that lead to adaptive behavior.” – Cosmides and Tooby 
(1994a: 328): “The brain is a complex computational device, a system that takes sensory information as input, 
transforms it in various ways, stores it, analyzes it, integrates it, applies decision rules to it, and then translates 
the output of those rules into the muscular contractions that we call ‘behavior.’” 
53 The term “program” is explicitly employed in analogy to its use in information science. As Tooby and 
Cosmides (1992: 66) note: “(A)n information-processing program, whether in an organism or in a computer, is a 
set of invariant relationships between informational inputs and ‘behavioral’ outputs.” 
54 Tooby and Cosmides (1992: 103): “The inexhaustible range of possibilities latent in behavior, categorization, 
interpretation, decision and so on, is not just an abstract philosophical point. It is an implacable reality facing 
every problem-solving computational system. ... Any design for an organism that cannot generate appropriate 
decisions, inferences, or perceptions ... is lost in an ocean of erroneous possibilities.”   20 
5. Purposive Action as Program-Based Behavior 
 
Methodological dualism represents what Tooby and Cosmides (1992: 21) describe as a 
“doctrine of intellectual isolationism,” a doctrine that, as they note, “has been the reigning 
view in the social sciences” (ibid.). It is one of the more wider ranging ambitions of 
evolutionary psychology to oppose the doctrine of isolationism and to advance, instead, a 
“conceptual unification” (ibid.), that seeks to systematically integrate explanatory efforts in 
the social sciences with insights that are generated in neighboring fields such as, for example, 
cognitive science, evolutionary biology or neurobiology.
55 Evolutionary psychologists see 
their own explanatory efforts embedded in a number of theoretical developments in several 
disciplines that point towards, as Tooby and Cosmides (ibid.: 23) call it, an “Integrated Causal 
Model” of human behavior, a model that “connects the social sciences to the rest of science” 
(ibid.: 24). 
  As noted before, evolutionary psychology is, indeed, just one among a number of 
recent research efforts that, in mutually compatible ways, seek to provide a naturalistic 
account of the cognitive foundations of human behavior (Vanberg 2002; 2004). The central 
theoretical notions around which these research efforts center have been captured, in a 
particularly pointed manner, in Ernst Mayr’s concept of teleonomic or program-based 
behavior and in K.R. Popper’s concept of conjecture-based problem-solving. Their arguments 
deserve to be, at least briefly, discussed here. 
  Evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr has suggested an outlook at purposeful behavior 
that locates the capacity for goal-directedness and intentionality in the presence of behavioral 
programs that are encoded in an organism and enable the organism to anticipate the 
consequences of its own actions.
56 Mayr refers to such purposeful, intentional behavior as 
teleonomic behavior in order to avoid the ambiguities of the term ‘teleological’
57 as well as to 
emphasize that his ambition is to provide a nomological, causal explanation of goal-
directedness and intentionality. As he explains: “A teleonomic process or behavior is one that 
owes its goal-directedness to the operation of a program” (Mayr 1992: 127). And such 
program-based behavior, he argues, can be explained in causal terms, “there is no conflict 
between causality and teleonomy” (Mayr 1961: 1504). 
  Expressly adopting the concept from information theory, Mayr defines a program as 
“a set of instructions” (Mayr 1992: 128), as “coded or prearranged information that controls a 
process (or behavior) leading toward a goal” (ibid.: 127f.). Programs can serve to guide goal-
directed behavior because they incorporate conjectural knowledge of the world, knowledge of 
relevant contingencies based on which likely consequences of alternative courses of action 
can be anticipated. Such programs can, in principle, be stated as instructions or decision-rules 
of the form, “if problem of type A is encountered, then action of type X is a suitable 
response.”
58 An important consequence of looking, as Mayr suggests, at purposeful action as 
program-based behavior is that it draws one’s attention to two principal issues. This is, on the 
one hand, the question of how programs are coded in an organism and how they become 
adapted to the organism’s respective problem-environment. Mayr uses the term encoding to 
refer to this issue. And this is, on the other hand, the question of how coded programs can be 
implemented to provide guidance in specific choice situations, an issue that Mayr refers to as 
                                                            
55 It could be just as well be directed against ‘hermeneutical Austrians’ when Tooby and Cosmides (1992: 22) 
note in reference to an other advocate of ‘hermeneutics’: “For example, Clifford Geertz advocates abandoning 
the ground of principled causal analysis entirely in favor of treating social phenomena as ‘texts’ to be interpreted 
just as one might interpret literature.” 
56 I have discussed Mayr’s approach in more detail in Vanberg (2002: 15ff.). 
57 E. Mayr (1961: 1504): “We biologists have long felt that it is ambiguous to designate such programmed, goal-
directed behavior ‘teleological,’ because the word teleological has also been used in a very different sense.” 
58 Such instructions or decision-rules can, of course, reach any degree of complexity by additional specifications 
added to the if-clause and the then-clause.   21 
decoding. Decoding is about solving the problem of applying programs or decision-rules that 
are about types of problem-situations and types of actions to specific choice-situations, 
situations that are always unique in their particular constellations of circumstances.  
Encoding can, as Mayr points out, be explained as a feed-back process that establishes 
a systematic link between the performance of programs (success or failure) and their future 
role in guiding behavior. The two main processes through which such encoding occurs are 
evolution, affecting genetically encoded programs, and learning, affecting memory-coded 
programs. The encoding that the evolutionary biologist studies – and that evolutionary 
psychologists focus their attention on – is governed by the feed-back process of natural 
selection of successful programs, a process through which ‘knowledge’ is incorporated in 
genetic codes that allow for adapted behavior. The genetically coded programs, in turn, 
provide the foundation on which - or the framework within which - the learning of memory-
coded programs occurs.
59 
The distinction between encoding and decoding corresponds to Mayr’s distinction 
between ultimate and proximate causes of behavior and between the explanatory focus of the 
“functional biologist” and the “evolutionary biologist.” Proximate causes of behavior are the 
programs that govern the responses of the individual to the immediate factors of the 
environment (Mayr 1961: 1503). Ultimate causes of behavior are the factors that have shaped 
these programs. The functional biologist who “deals with all aspects of the decoding of the 
information contained in the DNA code” (ibid.: 1502) is interested in the proximate causes of 
behavior. By contrast, the evolutionary biologist who studies “the laws that control the 
changes of these codes from generation to generation” (ibid.: 1502) is interested in the 
ultimate causes that “are responsible for the evolution of the particular DNA code of 
information with which every individual of every species is endowed” (ibid.: 1503).  
To explain behavior in terms of proximate causes means to employ conjectures about 
the “psychological mechanisms” or “programs” that allow an individual to cope with 
problems faced in its environment.
60 Looked at from such a perspective, the method of 
“Verstehen” or “understanding” can be interpreted as a particular research strategy for 
conjecturing about “proximate causes” of behavior, namely the strategy of imagining oneself 
in the choice-situation faced by the individual whose behavior is to be explained. As 
discussed above, the problem the Verstehen-approach faces is that, if one wants to escape 
circular reasoning, one needs to specify operational methods for how the conjectures 
generated by ‘understanding’ can be critically examined. Mayr’s distinction between 
proximate and ultimate causes of behavior suggests ways in which conjectures about 
“psychological mechanisms” or “programs” can be checked, namely in light of conjectures 
about how they themselves have come to be what they are. Conjectures about genetically 
coded cognitive mechanisms, for instance, can be critically analyzed in light of the question 
whether they could have evolved in the kind of problem-environment to which our species 
was exposed in evolutionary time.
61 And conjectures about individually acquired, memory-
coded behavioral dispositions can be critically questioned as to whether they could have been 
plausibly learned in the kind of environment to which the individual in question was exposed. 
                                                            
59 Mayr (1961: 1502): “It is characteristic of these genetic codes that the programming is only in part rigid. Such 
phenomena as learning, memory, non-genetic structural modification, and regeneration show how ‘open’ these 
programs are.” 
60 Adopting the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes of behavior Cosmides and Tooby (1987: 
281f.) note: “(T)he psychology of an organism consists of the total set of proximate mechanisms that cause 
behavior. ... (B)ehavior is an effect produced by a causal system: proximately by psychological mechanism.” 
61 This is, as explained above, the explicit aim of evolutionary psychology. As Cosmides and Tooby (1987: 283) 
put it: “Evolutionary psychology ... relates explanations in terms of adaptive strategy to explanations in terms of 
proximate mechanisms. ... Psychological mechanisms constitute the missing causal link between evolutionary 
theory and behavior. ... (I)t is the proximate mechanisms that cause behavior that promise to reveal the level of 
underlying order for a science of human behavior.”   22 
In other words, conjectures about ultimate causes can provide indirect evidence for testing 
conjectures about proximate causes. 
As Mayr emphasizes, to claim that teleonomic purposiveness can be explained in 
causal terms does not mean to ignore that “causality in biology is a far cry from causality in 
mechanics” (Mayr 1961: 1506). It is meant, however, to insist that the differences that divide 
these fields are a matter of complexity and not of different principles of explanation.
62 In 
terms similar to Hayek’s comments on theories of complex phenomena, Mayr argues that it is 
because of the individuality and uniqueness characteristic of the organic world that 
“explanation will often have to be so unspecific and so purely formal that its explanatory 
value can certainly be challenged” (ibid.: 1503). To recognize such limits in the specificity of 
the explanations that can be provided does, however, not mean at all to “question the ultimate 
causality of all biological phenomena” (ibid.). Nor should the fact that the complexity of 
biological phenomena often precludes prediction be mistaken as a “lack of cause” (1505). As 
Mayr (ibid.: 1506) puts it: “The complexities of biological causality do not justify embracing 
nonscientific ideologies ... but should encourage all those who have been trying to give a 
broader basis to the concept of causality.”  
A general outlook at purposeful action that is very similar to E. Mayr’s notion of 
program-based behavior has been suggested by K.R. Popper who argues that the behavior of 
all organisms – including purposeful human action – can be viewed as conjecture-based 
problem-solving behavior.
63 Problem-solving, Popper (1982: 150) states, is what all behavior 
– in fact, all life – is about. Like Mayr’s approach, Popper’s suggested outlook is meant to 
draw attention to the fact that the capacity to solve problems presupposes knowledge of 
relevant contingencies in the problem-environment. It posits that, as problem-solving agents, 
all living beings are guided in their behavior by pre-existing expectations about the world 
around them, expectations that constitute the organism’s conjectural knowledge of the world. 
And all such knowledge is, so Popper notes, the result of conjecture and refutation, of 
“competitive tentative solutions and the elimination of error” (Popper 1972: 145).
64 
According to Popper, it is only in the light of its repertoire of conjectural expectations 
that an organism can perceive and identify problems. In other words, perception is always a 
theory-impregnated act of selective interpretation (ibid: 343). This is, as Popper argues, no 
less true for our most elementary, un- or subconscious sensory perceptions than for our most 
reflected scientific observations.
65 And just as we can only perceive our environment in the 
light of pre-existing conjectural expectations it is, he insists, only on the basis of our 
conjectural knowledge of the world that we can act and respond to the problems we face. 
Using the same language as E. Mayr, Popper speaks of such action-guiding conjectural 
knowledge as “action programs” (Popper and Eccles 1990: 134), as “dispositions to act, or to 
behave” (ibid.: 130).
66 
The principal mechanism that governs the acquisition of expectations and conjectural 
knowledge is, as Popper supposes, essentially the same for all kinds of “knowledge,” whether 
it is incorporated in sense organs (Popper 1972: 72) or in explicitly stated scientific theories. 
As he puts it: “From the amoeba to Einstein, the growth of knowledge is always the same: we 
try to solve our problems, and to obtain, by a process of elimination something approaching 
                                                            
62 Mayr (1961: 1506): “Causality in biology is not in real conflict with the causality of classical mechanics.”  
63 I have discussed Popper’s arguments in more detail in Vanberg (2002: 19ff.). 
64 K.R. Popper (1972: 145): “The tentative solutions which animals and plants incorporate into their anatomy 
and their behavior are biological analogues of theories and vice versa: theories correspond ... to endosomatic 
organs and their ways of functioning. Just like theories, organs and their functions are tentative adaptations to the 
world we live in.” 
65 The ‘conjectures’ built into our (sense-)organs can, Popper (1972: 146) notes, be regarded as “the biological 
predecessors of linguistically formulated theories.” 
66 Popper does, in fact, explicitly – and approvingly – refer to Mayr’s concept of program-based behavior 
(Popper 1987: 151).   23 
adequacy in our tentative solutions” (Popper 1972: 261). All acquired knowledge – whether it 
is acquired in the process of genetic evolution or in the process of individual learning – 
consists, this is Popper’ central claim, in the modification “of some form of knowledge, or 
disposition, which was there previously, and in the last instance of inborn expectations” (ibid.: 
71). 
Popper’s theory of conjecture-based problem solving and of the growth of knowledge 
through trial-and-error elimination has become a major inspiration for evolutionary 
epistemology,
67 a research paradigm that has been developed independently of (and prior to) 
evolutionary psychology, but is closely related to the latter (Vanberg: 2002: 33ff.).
68 The 
central tenet of evolutionary epistemology is that all knowledge processes, i.e. processes that 
lead to an expansion of knowledge or problem-solving capacity, can be interpreted as 
instances of the "variation and selective retention process of evolutionary adaptation" 
(Campbell 1974: 450f.), where the latter is broadly understood to include genetic evolution as 
well as cultural evolution and the “variation and selection processes” that constitute individual 
learning (Vanberg 1994a: 174ff.).
69  
What makes evolutionary epistemology particularly noteworthy in the present context 
is the fact that F.A. Hayek is counted among its principal founders.
70 In the section below I 
shall take a closer look at Hayek’s approach, an approach that exemplifies an interpretation of 
Austrian subjectivism that is markedly different from the methodological dualism advocated 
by authors like Mises, Lachmann and the ‘hermeneutical Austrians.’  
 
 
6. F.A. Hayek: An Alternative Austrian Research Program 
 
By contrast to the versions of Austrian subjectivism discussed above (section 2), F.A. Hayek 
advocates what one may describe as “naturalistic subjectivism.” He has developed a research 
program that seeks to provide economics with a behavioral foundation entirely compatible 
with an empiricist methodology. Beyond the few remarks made above (section 3), I shall not 
address here the often discussed issue of whether there has been a systematic shift in Hayek’s 
methodological outlook since the late 1930s and early 1940s “in a direction away from Mises 
toward Popper” (Boehm 1982: 50). What is of relevance in the present context is that already 
in his programmatic 1936 Presidential Address to the London Economic Club (Hayek 1948a) 
Hayek explicitly outlined an empiricist research agenda for a subjectivist economics, a 
research agenda that he has systematically explored in various directions in his later work on 
markets as systems of communication and on cultural evolution as a process of “collective 
learning” (Vanberg 1994a), as well as in what is often described as the most unusual part of 
his life-work, his contribution to theoretical psychology (Hayek 1952). 
  In “Economics and Knowledge,” Hayek takes issue with an economic theory that fails 
to address what must, in his view, be a principal concern of an explanatory economics, 
namely the knowledge problem, i.e. the problem of how effective economic coordination is 
achieved in the real world among agents who possess only subjective, incomplete and 
imperfect pieces of knowledge of the complex contingencies on which the successful pursuit 
                                                            
67 The name “evolutionary epistemology” appears to have been coined by Donald T. Campbell (1974). 
68 Surprisingly, even though the research program of evolutionary epistemology predates the emergence of 
evolutionary psychology, authors who publish in the latter field seem to have taken no notice of its existence. 
69 M. Tomasello (1999: 216) refers to these three levels of evolutionary adaptation when he notes: “Modern adult 
cognition of the human kind is the product of genetic events taking place over many millions of years in 
evolutionary time but also of cultural events taking place over many tens of thousands of years in historical time 
and personal events taking place over many tens of thousands of hours in ontogenetic time.” 
70 In his survey of the field W.W. Bartley (1987: 20f.) lists F.A. Hayek among its “founders,” besides K.R. 
Popper, D.T. Campbell, Ernst Mayr and  Konrad Lorenz.    24 
of their plans depends.
71 The principal target of Hayek’s critique is a formal equilibrium 
analysis which evades “any real solution of the problem” (1948a: 51) by falling “in effect 
back on the assumption that everybody knows everything” (ibid.), an assumption that answers 
the question of how markets operate in a purely tautological manner but does not inform us 
about how they actually function.
72 Implicitly, his critique is, however, also directed at Mises’ 
praxeological a priorism, as can be concluded from Hayek’s comments on a “Pure Logic of 
Choice” which is concerned with what “we know to be common to all human thought” 
(Hayek 1948a: 47). The ‘axioms’ of the ‘pure logic of choice,’ Hayek notes, define the kind of 
phenomena which we seek to understand, namely ‘conscious’ as distinguished from 
‘instinctive’ action, and in this sense they are, of course, “universally applicable to the field in 
which we are interested” (ibid.). Yet, so Hayek states in no uncertain terms, the “tautological 
transformations of the Pure Logic of Choice” (ibid.: 39) have little to do with an explanation 
of social reality. As he puts it: “But the assumptions or hypotheses, which we have to 
introduce when we want to explain the social process, concern the relation of the thought of 
an individual to the outside world, the question to what extent and how his knowledge 
corresponds to the external facts. And the hypotheses must necessarily run in terms of 
assertions about causal connections, about how experience creates knowledge” (ibid.).  
  Hayek emphasizes, not any less than other Austrians do, the subjectivity of the 
valuations and theories that inform human action.
73 He explicitly stresses that “the analysis of 
what people will do can start only from what is known to them” (Hayek 1948a: 44),
74 and that 
“not only man’s action toward external objects but also the relations between men and all the 
social institutions can be understood only by what men think about them” (Hayek 1979: 57). 
Yet, Hayek’s methodological conclusions from the subjectivist premise are clearly different 
from those drawn by authors like Mises or Lachmann. This is not to deny the often observed 
fact that some of Hayek’s arguments on the matter – in particular in his essay on “Scientism 
and the Study of Society” (Hayek 1979: 17ff.) – appear to come close to Mises’ views.
75 Yet, 
as has been noted above (pp.13f.), a careful reading of these arguments, especially a reading 
that gives appropriate weight to Hayek’s later clarifying comments, cannot fail to recognize 
that Hayek’s version of subjectivism systematically differs in its methodological orientation 
from Mises’ – as well as from Lachmann’s – subjectivist outlook. By contrast to them his 
ambition clearly is to develop an empirical, explanatory theory of the role of knowledge or 
mental phenomena in human action and social interaction.  
  As far as the method of understanding is concerned on which e.g. Lachmann puts so 
much emphasis as the distinctive method of the social sciences, Hayek acknowledges that we 
                                                            
71 As Hayek has later stated it in an other context: “But the concrete knowledge which guides the actions of any 
group of people never exists as a consistent and coherent body. It only exists in the dispersed, incomplete, and 
inconsistent form in which it appears in many individual minds, and the dispersion and imperfection of all 
knowledge are the two basic facts from which the social sciences have to start” (1979: 49f.) 
72 In his later seminal article on “The Use of Knowledge in Society” Hayek noted about the prominence of 
“equilibrium analysis” in economics: “But I fear that our theoretical habits of approaching the problem with the 
assumption of more or less perfect knowledge on the part of almost everyone has made us somewhat blind to the 
true function of the price mechanism and led us to apply rather misleading standards in judging its efficiency” 
(1948c: 87). 
73 Kirzner (1992b: 132) recognizes Hayek’s concern with the role of knowledge as “a decisive, explicit extension 
of subjectivism in modern economics.” 
74 Hayek specifically notes that in our efforts to explain human action we must remain aware of the difference 
between what is known by “the observing economist” (1948a: 39) and what is “known to the persons whose 
behavior we try to explain” (ibid.). And he points to the obvious – though in standard rational choice accounts 
often ignored – fact that “no superior knowledge the observer may possess about the object, but which is not 
possessed by the acting person, can help in understanding the motives of their actions” (1948b: 60). – On this 
issue see also Hayek (1979: 51). 
75 In fact, in a footnote to his often quoted remark “that every important advance in economic theory during the 
last hundred years was a further step in the consistent application of subjectivism” Hayek (1979: 52) states: 
“This is a development which has probably been carried out most consistently by Ludwig von Mises.”   25 
surely “constantly act on the assumption that we can in this way interpret other people’s 
actions on the analogy of our own mind” (1948b: 64). Yet, he cautions that such analogies are 
mere conjectures, “that we can never be sure” (ibid.), and “that we can understand less and 
less as we turn to beings more and more different from ourselves” (ibid.: 66).
76 More 
importantly even, Hayek’s own understanding of what ‘understanding’ is about is not in 
contrast to the notion of nomological explanation but is, instead, perfectly compatible with it 
(Hayek 1967c: 58ff.). 
  Hayek’s intention in emphasizing the role of subjective knowledge in human action is, 
quite apparently, not to claim a special methodological status – whether praxeological or 
hermeneutical – for economic and social analysis. To the contrary, his concern is with 
“economics as an empirical science” (1948a: 44), it is with an empirical, explanatory 
approach to “the role which assumptions and propositions about the knowledge possessed by 
different members in society play in economic analysis” (ibid.: 33). And such an empirical 
approach, he insists, must be based on conjectures about how knowledge is acquired and 
expectations are formed (Hayek 1979: 57), on “empirical propositions ... about how people 
will learn” (1948a: 55). These conjectures, Hayek emphasizes, are empirically testable 
“assumptions about causation” (ibid.: 46) and, as such, are “of a fundamentally different 
nature” not only from the propositions of formal equilibrium analysis (ibid.: 55), they are also 
“rather different from the general assumptions from which the Pure Logic of Choice starts” 
(ibid.: 46). 
  What is, in the present context, even more important than Hayek’s programmatic 
methodological arguments is the fact that, from his 1936 lecture on “Economics and 
Knowledge” (1948a) on, Hayek systematically pursued an empirical subjectivist research 
agenda that focuses on the issue of how imperfect human agents – instead of fictitious, 
perfectly rational homines oeconomici – acquire and communicate the subjective knowledge 
of the world that allows them relatively successfully to operate within their respective 
problem environments, and relatively successfully to cooperate with, and coordinate their 
actions with, other agents who are equally limited in their understanding of the complexities 
of the world around them. Hayek’s entire life work can be viewed as a systematic effort to 
explore different aspects of this fundamental issue. His theory of the spontaneous order of the 
market seeks to explain how the price mechanism operates as a system of communication by 
which the fragments of knowledge dispersed among myriads of agents in an extended 
network of exchange relations are utilized to effectively transmit throughout the system 
information about changes in relative scarcities. His theory of competition as a discovery 
procedure seeks to explain how the market functions as an open experimental arena in which, 
by way of trial and error, continuously new and superior solutions to economic problems are 
discovered (solutions which may in turn, of course, generate new problems of their own). His 
theory of cultural evolution seeks to explain how the inter-personal and inter-group variety in 
acquired practices, artifacts, normative beliefs and conjectural knowledge feeds into a process 
of competitive selection that results in an inter-generational accumulation of experience-based 
problem-solving knowledge. Finally, and of particular interest in the present context, there is 
Hayek’s theory on how the human mind operates as the “repository” of subjective knowledge, 
an empiricist theory of mental phenomena that is outlined in detail in his The Sensory Order – 
An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology (1952) as well as in some of his 
other contributions devoted to epistemological issues (1967a,b,c,d; 1978b; 1979: 31ff.).  
  About the theoretical perspective laid out in The Sensory Order W.B. Weimer (1982: 
281) has said that it “is compatible with ... the resurgence of cognitive psychology (post-
Chomsky and psycholinguistics), as well as the methodological views of science advanced by 
Karl Popper.” Even though it has found much less attention than other parts of Hayek’s work, 
                                                            
76 For a comparison to Mises’ view on the role of ‘understanding’ in the social sciences see Mises (1978: 50, 71; 
1990: 8f.).   26 
the significance of The Sensory Order in the context of his overall research program has been 
well recognized by Hayek-experts such as Bruce Caldwell (2000: 9f.), while experts in 
modern cognitive neuroscience have praised Hayek’s contribution as anticipating, in essence, 
ideas that have only more recently gained wider recognition in this field.
77 
In The Sensory Order Hayek took up and expanded ideas that he had outlined several 
decades earlier as a young student in a manuscript, entitled Beiträge zur Theorie der 
Entwicklung des Bewusstseins (Contributions to a Theory of How Consciousness Develops) 
(Hayek 1920). In the abstract of this early paper he had explicitly stated that it was his 
ambition to propose a theory of the mind compatible with the world view of the natural 
sciences.
78 The term “sensory order” is used by Hayek (1982: 288) to refer to an organism’s 
internal (mental) representations or ‘models’ of the outer world, models that embody 
knowledge of relevant contingencies in the organism’s problem environment.  
Of particular significance in the present context is Hayek’s claim that these internal 
representations or models provide the clue to our understanding of adaptive or purposive 
behavior (Hayek 1952: 122ff.). The fact that these internal models allow the organism to 
anticipate the likely consequences from different kinds of behavior is, in his view, the 
essential ingredient of purposive, problem-solving behavior. In this sense, Hayek notes, even 
machines governed by programs – such as, for example, “automatic pilots for aircraft” (ibid.: 
126) – may be said to exhibit ‘purposive’ (problem-solving) behavior. Though such machine-
behavior is, of course, very primitive compared to the complexities of human behavior, it has 
in common with the latter that it owes its problem-solving capacity to the existence of 
programs in which knowledge of relevant contingencies of the environment is incorporated.
79 
In Hayek’s account it is through the mind’s “internal representations” – through 
models, rules or dispositions
80 – that all human perception as well as human action is guided, 
from our pre- or sub-conscious adaptations to our most deliberate and reflected responses to 
problems (Hayek 1952: 86f.; 145f.; 1967c: 45).
81 It is, he argues, only on the basis of the 
                                                            
77 J.M. Fuster (1995: 87ff.): “The first proponent of cortical memory networks on a major scale was neither a 
neuroscientist nor a computer scientist but, curiously, a Viennese economist: Friedrich von Hayek. ... Although 
devoid of mathematical elaboration, Hayek’s model clearly contains most of the elements of those later network 
models of associative memory. ... The main reason for dwelling here on Hayek’s model is simply that it has 
certain properties ... that conform exceptionally well to recent neurobiological evidence on memory.” – Fuster 
(ibid.: 89) points to G. Edelman  as “one of the theoreticians of the brain to have acknowledged the importance 
of Hayek’s contribution” (Fuster ibid.: 90). See G. Edelman (1987: 25). 
78 In retrospect, Hayek (1982: 289) has noted about the writing of The Sensory Order: “When I then, about 1946, 
began looking at the current psychological literature, I found to my amazement that my problem seemed to be in 
exactly the same state in which I had left it 25 years before.” – Hayek’s principal reference at the time was D.O. 
Hebb’s (1949) neuropsychological theory which has been of major influence on the development of modern 
cognitive neuroscience. - It is worth noting that J.H. Holland (whose theory of complex adaptive systems is very 
much compatible with Hayek’s views in The Sensory Order) cites Hebb’s theory as the major inspiration for his 
own work (Holland 1998: 19). – On Holland’s theory see Vanberg (2004: 30ff.). 
79 Hayek (1952: 126): “Such machines ... would lack the capacity of learning from experience. But although for 
this reason such machines cannot be described as brains, with regard to purposiveness they differ from a brain 
merely in degree and not in kind.” 
80 Hayek uses the terms ‘models,’ ‘rules’ and ‘dispositions’ alternatively to describe the mental events that take 
place “between the input of (external and internal) stimuli and the output of action” (Hayek 1982: 288). – While 
in The Sensory Order he mostly speaks of ‘models,’ in later publications he prefers to speak of “rules of action 
(or dispositions)” (Hayek 1978b: 43). As he notes: “(D)ispositions toward kinds of movements can be regarded 
as adaptations to typical features of the environment, and the ‘recognition’ of such features as the activiation of 
the kind of disposition adapted to them. ...  (A)ll the ‘knowledge’ of the external world which such an organism 
possesses consists in the action patterns which the stimuli tend to evoke. ... (W)hat we call knowledge is 
primarily a system of rules of action” (ibid.: 41). 
81 On the “connection between the rules governing perception and the rules governing action” (1967c: 56) Hayek 
notes: “(T)he perception of events can also be regarded as a subsummation of particular stimuli, or groups of 
stimuli, as elements of an abstract class to which a response possessing certain characteristics is appropriate” 
(1978b: 40).   27 
knowledge already incorporated in such internal representations that we are able, on the one 
hand, to single out in our perceptions those aspects of “the inexhaustible totality of 
everything” (Hayek 1979: 121) that are of relevance to us and, on the other hand, to select the 
appropriate, problem-solving course of action from an open-ended set of potential responses 
(Hayek 1978b: 38).
82 As Hayek (1973: 30) puts it: “We never act, and could never act, in full 
consideration of all the facts of a particular situation, but always by singling out as relevant 
some aspects of it.” The ‘singling out,’ in our perception as well as in our action, is guided by 
“schemata of thought” (ibid.: 31), by conjectural expectations or “abstractions”
83 that provide 
the “basis of man’s capacity to move successfully in a world very imperfectly known to him” 
(ibid.: 30).
84  
Hayek (1967b: 23) explicitly agrees with K.R. Popper’s argument that “observation is 
always observation in the light of theories,”
85 and like Popper he interprets “theory” in the 
broadest possible sense, to include the most basic genetically coded behavioral dispositions as 
well as the most reflected scientific conjectures, an interpretation captured in Popper’s 
statement, “from the amoeba to Einstein is just one step” (Popper 1972: 246).
86 And just like 
Popper he views the growth of knowledge in all forms as a process of trial and error-
elimination, as experience-based “modification of previous knowledge” (Popper 1972: 71). As 
Hayek (1952: 143) puts it, “all we know about the world is of the nature of theories and all 
‘experience’ can do is to change these theories.”
87 More specifically, Hayek interprets the 
process through which mental models, rules or dispositions become better adapted to the 
relevant problem environment as a process of classification and reclassification that is 
controlled by success and failure (Hayek 1952: 147).
88 In case of “expectations which will not 
be borne out by events” a reclassification or a “change of the frame of reference” is induced, 
controlled by, as Hayek puts it, “the pragmatic needs of the individual and the species” (ibid.: 
145f., 168f.).
89 
In Hayek’s account, the evolution of the mental order proceeds as a continuous 
reorganization of the classificatory apparatus in light of which external events are interpreted, 
at the level of biological evolution as well as at the level of behavioral learning and at the 
level of conceptual thinking (Hayek 1952: 107f.; 1967c: 52). At all levels, rules and 
dispositions better adapted to the actual contingencies in the world are a fruit not of pre-
                                                            
82 Cosmides and Tooby (1987: 297) refer to the same issue when they note: “There are an infinite number of 
dimensions that could be used to cave the environment into categories; there is no assurance that a general-
purpose information processing system would ever ... guide such a system toward the appropriate dimensions.” 
83 Hayek (1952: 143): “(A)ll sensory perception is therefore in a sense ‘abstract’, it always selects certain 
features or aspects of a given situation. ... Even the so-called elementary sensory qualities are in this sense 
‘abstractions’.” -  See also Hayek (1978b: 44).  
84 Hayek (1952: 142): “Perception is thus always an interpretation, the placing of something into one or several 
classes of objects.” - On “the general point that all perception involves a theory or hypothesis” see also Hayek 
(1967b: 23f.; 1967c: 53; 1978b: 37f.; 1979: 119).  
85 Hayek (1978b: 43) emphasizes the correspondence between his notion of “the primacy of the rules of action 
(or dispositions)” and Popper’s argument “that the capacity to generalize comes first and the hypotheses are then 
tested and confirmed or refuted according to their effectiveness as guides to action.” 
86 Hayek (1978b: 46): “(T)he capacity for abstraction manifests itself already in the actions of organisms to 
which we surely have no reason to attribute anything like consciousness.” – See also Hayek (1952: 108).  
87 In a footnote Hayek (1952: 143) adds: “I owe this way of putting it to my friend K.R. Popper, who, however, 
may not entirely agree with this use I am making of his ideas.” 
88 About the general outlook he adopted in The Sensory Order Hayek has noted in retrospect that he was led “to 
interpret the central nervous system as an apparatus of multiple classification or, better, as a process of 
continuous and simultaneous classification and constant reclassification on many levels (of the legion of 
impulses proceeding in it at any moment), applied in the first instance to all sensory perception but in principle 
to all kinds of mental entities, such as emotions, concepts, images, drives, etc., that we find to occur in the 
mental universe” (1982: 289).  
89 Hayek (1979: 36, fn. 8): “The classification of the stimuli in our central nervous system is probably highly 
‘pragmatic’ in the sense that it ... stresses those relationships between the external world ... and our body which 
in the course of evolution have proved significant for the survival of the species.”   28 
adapted ‘foresight’ but of tentative conjectures and ex-post selection by consequences.
90 
While the ‘knowledge’ that has been accumulated over the evolutionary history of our species 
is incorporated, as genetically coded conjectures, in our sense (and other) organs, the 
capability of learning allows an organism to accumulate experience-based problem-solving 
knowledge over its lifetime that is incorporated in memory-coded models, rules or 
dispositions (Hayek 1952: 53, 106, 108, 129ff., 166; 1967c: 51). At the level of “conceptual 
thinking,” in particular in science, knowledge grows by way of deliberate conjectural 
reclassifications that progressively replace “the classification of events which our senses 
provide” (Hayek 1979: 31), in order to account for problems we encounter in the world of our 
experience, “problems which can be answered only by altering the picture which our senses 
give us of that world” (Hayek 1952: 173). 
While Hayek’s ambition is to provide a naturalistic, explanatory account of mental 
phenomena, he emphasizes that, due to the complexity of the processes involved, “we shall 
never be able to achieve more than an explanation of the principle on the which mind 
operates, and shall never succeed in fully explaining any particular mental act” (Hayek 1952: 
34). In the impossibility of a “full explanation” (ibid.: 439) of particular acts he sees, 
however, no reason at all to discard the standard notion of causal explanation. We can, as he 
argues, hold the view that every single action of a human being is caused by “the inherited 
structure of his body (particularly of its nervous system) and of all the external influences 
which have acted upon it since birth” (Hayek 1967b: 37) and, at the same time, insist that, “in 
spite of our knowledge of the principle on which the human mind works” (ibid.), we will in 
general not be able to explain single actions because it is impossible for us “to state the full 
set of particular facts which brought it about that the individual did a particular thing at a 
particular time” (ibid.).
91  
The limits of explanation and prediction in the realm of human action are, in the sense 
explained, for Hayek not a matter of fundamental methodological differences between the 
natural sciences and the sciences of human action. They are due to the uniqueness and novelty 
that characterizes the operation of a complex rule-governed system such as the human mind, a 
system that can adapt to a complex and changing environment through the simultaneous, 
combined application of models or rules (Hayek 1952; 130f.).
92 As he puts it: “It is this 
determination of particular actions by various combinations of abstract propensities which 
makes it possible for a causally determined structure of actions to produce ever new actions it 
has never produced before, and therefore to produce altogether new behavior such as we do 
not expect from what we usually describe as a mechanism. Even a relatively limited repertory 
of abstract rules that can thus be combined into particular actions will be capable of ‘creating’ 
an almost infinite variety of particular actions” (Hayek 1978b: 48f.). 
 
 
                                                            
90 Hayek (1978b: 42): “It seems to me that the organism first develops new potentialities for actions and that 
only afterwards does experience select and confirm those which are useful as adaptations to typical 
characteristics of its environment. There will thus be gradually developed by natural selection a repertory of 
action types adapted to standard features of the environment.” 
91 Hayek (1967: 37): “The individual personality would remain for us as much a unique and unaccountable 
phenomenon ... whose specific actions we could generally not predict or control, because we could not obtain the 
information on all the particular facts which determined it.” 
92 Hayek’s essential argument - namely that an apparatus that builds models by combining more basic rules “is 
of much greater efficiency than could be any ... apparatus which contained, as it were, a few fixed models of 
typical situations” (1952: 131) is very similar to the central argument in J.H. Holland’s theory of complex 
adaptive agents, namely that such agents use “building blocks to generate internal models” of the ever new 
problem situations they encounter (Vanberg 2004: 31).   29 
7. Conclusion 
 
My purpose in writing this paper has been to take issue with a tradition in Austrian economics 
that claims that recognizing the subjectivist determinants of human action requires economics 
(as well as the other social sciences) to adopt a different methodology than the causal 
explanatory approach of the natural sciences. In the preceding sections I have sought to 
counter this claim in a number of ways. I have examined the arguments that have been 
advanced in defense of this claim, and I have given reasons why these arguments must be 
doubted (section 3). I have discussed the research program of evolutionary psychology as an 
example of theoretical developments in modern psychology and cognitive science that seek to 
account, in an explicitly naturalistic manner, for the cognitive foundations of human action 
(section 4), and I have cited E. Mayr’s and K.R. Popper’s concepts of program- or conjecture-
based behavior as theoretical paradigms that show how human purposefulness can be 
analyzed within a causal explanatory framework (section 5). Finally, I have argued that an 
outlook at subjectivism that is perfectly compatible with these naturalistic approaches can, 
indeed, be found within the Austrian tradition itself, namely in F.A. Hayek’s theory of rule-
based perception and action (section 6).  
To the extent that modern Austrian economics, explicitly or implicitly, adheres to the 
methodological dualism advocated by authors like Mises and Lachmann, the arguments 
developed in this paper call for a reorientation. They are meant to show that the subjectivist 
research program of the Austrian tradition need not be associated at all with an anti-
naturalistic methodology, but can well be pursued within a causal explanatory framework. 
They are an invitation to turn “the Austrian school ... into an evolutionary school” (Witt 2003: 
26) or, to borrow a phrase from J.H. Barkow (1992: 635), to practice Austrian economics as 
“an evolutionarily informed and psychology-compatible social science.” 
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